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Contemporary studies of Peace Journalism have yet to examine how 
photographs, as visual content captured by print media, fit within the model 
of Peace Journalism. In this research, a content analysis of press images 
was conducted using predefined methodology on newspaper coverage of the 
annual July 12th Drumcree Parades (Marching) in Portadown, Northern 
Ireland, during the pre-, intra-, and post-peace process that occurred 
between 1996 and 2000. In most newspapers, the proportions of both 
violent/aggressive and nonviolent/non-peaceful content were higher in the 
relatively peaceful period of 2000, as compared to their proportions in at least 
one of the other ‘violent’ years of 1996 and 1998. No overall trend in content 
was observed in relation to the level of violence across 1996 to 2000. During 
this period, media practice in Portadown, Northern Ireland did not support the 
publication of newspaper commensurate with actual level of violence in the 
Northern Ireland or the depictions of peace building and the peaceful 
resolution of conflict. The implications of these findings for the development 
of ‘Peace Photojournalism’ are explored. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
“While the bombs and bullets may have stopped, the war of words and 
images went on.”  
-- Jeffrey A. Sluka1 
 
 
 
0.1  Beyond War Photography 
 
 
Photography that makes one think is difficult. In photographing destruction 
from a landmine explosion, bodies left from a genocidal massacre or a 
soldiers brandishing guns, you gain attention, sell newspapers, increase 
website traffic, and shock the viewer. But do you ultimately change thinking 
or behavior? What type of impact do these images have on the conflict itself 
and on the potential of its resolution? 
 
Images are powerful in expressing narratives, can retain a longer memory life, 
and provoke powerful reactions. In times of conflict, these reactions may be 
even more powerful than the spoken or written word, as in the following 
examples: 
 
• The photography of the fallen soldier by Robert Capa in the Spanish 
Civil War; 
 
• The short clip images of the beheadings of the kidnapped foreign 
workers in Iraq on the stations Al-Manar and Al Jazeera; 
                                                
1 (Sluka, 1996), p.382 
 2 
 
• The image of the young girl running from Napalm burns during the 
Vietnam War; 
 
• The image of the planes crashing into the twin towers on September 
11th, 2001; 
 
• The angry and violent responses to the Danish and French cartoon 
depictions of the Prophet Mohammed that insulted Muslims and led to 
widespread protest and violence; 
 
• And, more recently during the Syrian humanitarian crisis, three-year-
old Aylan Kurdi lying facedown on the beach. 
 
We are bombarded with typically negative images each day, often becoming 
desensitized and disinterested rather than motivated to act. Although we may 
fear a bombing or donate money to support famine relief efforts, we are 
rarely moved to long-term action, beyond the initial reaction of shock or rage. 
Further, these emotions are not inspired or complex; we respond viscerally, 
but are not necessarily challenged to think or to solve. For visual images to 
change behavior, they must provoke us to think beyond short-term, 
stereotypical, or knee-jerk reactions and beyond conventional ways of 
perceiving our world. While violent images of war and conflict highlight the 
repercussions of aggression, positive images fostering cultural understanding 
and peace building are lacking. 
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0.2  The Emergence of Peace Journalism 
 
Peace Journalism seeks to address the media’s role in conflict 
transformation through recognizing the role that the media plays in conflict, 
with particular focus on methods that media can use to mitigate its negative 
impact on conflict and to foster positive change in societies. Fundamental to 
its many approaches is developing an understanding of the skills in conflict 
resolution and engaging in complex analysis of conflict. Within the last two 
decades, the role of Peace Journalism has gained a growing acceptance in 
the field of conflict resolution, amongst peace researchers, peace 
practitioners, conflicting protagonists and media professionals. Peace 
Journalism encompasses multiple areas – Media Roles in Narrative; Media 
and Democratic Society; Media and Conflict; and Media and Peace-building 
– and all formats of media, including radio (spoken material), television 
(spoken and visual footage), the internet (spoken, written and visual), and 
print media (written stories and visual images including photographs and 
political cartoons). Other forms of media include: soap operas; animated 
programs or cartoons; documentaries; songs; plays; and others. 
 
As a theoretical model and as a practical approach, Peace Journalism 
endeavours to challenge the inherent assumptions held in the traditional 
media regarding their impact on conflict. The initial step in any approach of 
peace journalism is to recognize that the media is never inherently unbiased 
or neutral. Simply by being present or active in violent conflict situations, the 
media is a party to the conflict. Furthermore, the choices made by members 
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of the media in selecting the stories they report and the way in which their 
narratives are constructed always contain some bias. Such bias is 
particularly apparent when violent and non-violent conflicts are reduced to 
simple dualities between two parties, ignoring or minimizing the broader 
complexity of players and detractors. The media’s perspective is also 
narrowed by a short-term or myopic view of the conflict’s timeline, one that 
often does not incorporate an understanding of the history and the current 
context of the conflict. 
 
Numerous projects have assessed generally the relationship of peace 
building to the media. Several projects have documented the situation of 
conflict as perceived by one side or another in conflict, alongside exchange 
and dialogue projects. A further concept has been the creation of initiatives in 
which each of the parties in a conflict documents its own realities to share 
these images with the others. However, positive images are frequently 
lacking in media coverage of conflict situations and might otherwise 
disaggregate the conflict factions while highlighting the opportunities and 
potential for conflict resolution and conflict transformation within the various 
parties. Content analysis consists of an analysis of the content of media 
coverage, within a particular paper or on a specific conflict, by the press as a 
party to the conflict (Transcend, Glasgow Media Group).2 In contrast, 
audience surveys are used in peace journalism to link the media messages 
to the impact on perceptions of the conflict, opportunities for conflict 
resolution and the perceptions of ‘the other’ (Glasgow Media Group). 
 
                                                
2 Available at: www.transcend.org/pctrcluj2004/TRANSCEND_manual.pdf  
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Prior research of the relationship between media and conflict has focused 
primarily on textual or print journalism, through conducting content analysis 
of the coverage of violent conflicts by various newspapers and other print 
publications. More recently, attention has been extended to an emerging 
critique of television media broadcasts. To date, the majority of media 
research in conflict areas has been focused on the evidence of media 
partiality between the conflicting parties and a preoccupation with the violent 
outcomes of conflict. This work has contributed substantively to an 
understanding of how the media can perpetrate harm and negatively 
influence violent conflict. Furthermore, this research has fostered a 
constructive debate over the media’s purported characteristic of ‘objectivity’. 
 
The role in conflict of visual media, such as television images, online images, 
and print photography, has however not been well explored. Our lack of 
understanding of this role is related mainly to a lack of research in this area 
and methodological limitations of past content analysis and audience studies. 
Past work has been preoccupied with textual media, neglecting the 
potentially powerful role of visual media, such as photographs and other 
images appearing alongside written print coverage. In content analysis and 
audience studies conducted thus far (Glasgow Media Group; Gadi 
Wolfsfeld),3,4 the media has not been disaggregated, and the methods 
employed have not differentiated the visual content from the written or 
spoken material. Visual media is nevertheless a major independent 
component of media coverage and could significantly affect our perceptions 
                                                
3 Ibid 
4 (Wolfsfeld, 2004) 
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of conflict, including perceptions of whether opportunities exist for non-violent 
resolution and the parties to the conflict of ‘the other’. The impact of 
narratives told through the visual specter (Marshall McLuhan; Susan Sontag; 
Roland Barthes)5,6,7 may differ from other forms of story telling, and those 
differences are not well characterized. Chiefly, there has been very little 
focus on the possible positive contributions of the visual rhetoric of peace 
journalism to the field of conflict resolution.  
 
The present work thus seeks to examine how photographs, as visual content 
captured by the press media, fit within the model of Peace Journalism. This 
assessment will be performed through an analysis of the content of media 
images released by national newspapers in constructing their visual 
narratives during the conflict of Northern Ireland, from 1996 to 2000. The 
representation of this conflict through the newspapers’ printed images will be 
characterized in terms of the agency’s perception of the conflict and the 
different factions of the conflict, at measurement times that vary according to 
the intensity of the violence of conflict. In addition, this research seeks to 
introduce the concepts of peace photography and peace photojournalism into 
the peace and conflict lexicon. 
 
 
                                                
5 (McLuhan, 1964) 
6 (Sontag, 1990) 
7 (Barthes, 1981) 
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0.3  Hypothesis 
 
The basis for the hypothesis of this research is that the visual media is an 
integral yet overlooked component of Peace Journalism, both within its own 
theoretical model and in its potential contribution to peace-building and non-
violent conflict resolution. It is hypothesized that, across the period of 1996 
to 2000, the content of newspaper images from democratic countries 
regarding the annual July 12th Drumcree parades in Portadown, 
Northern Ireland does not vary according to level of violence in the 
Northern Ireland conflict and lacks depictions of peace building and the 
peaceful resolution of conflict. 
 
To evaluate this hypothesis, this research will appraise the content of press 
images during the above period and examine how the news photograph fits 
within the model of peace journalism and its potential contributions to 
processes of peace-building and non-violent conflict resolution. Evaluation 
will focus on newspaper photographic coverage of the Parade (Marching) 
Season representing the conflict in Northern Ireland, during the pre-, intra-, 
and post-peace process that occurred between 1996 and 2000. A content 
analysis of media practice will examine visual images, their relationship to 
the political events in the conflict and peace process as reported to printed 
text, and their potential consequences for the conflict and its resolution.  
 
Due to the limitations of its methodology, this research is unable to conduct 
the necessary audience surveys necessary to demonstrate a link between 
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photographic images, audience perception and resulting action. However, 
taking the present work together with recent research by various media 
research groups linking content analysis and audience surveys, some 
deductions may be drawn to understand the probable relation between 
photographic material and conflict processes. 
 
Although this work cannot define the causal pathways between visual images, 
words and actions in conflict settings, it serves to expand the existing bodies 
of research in media and peace journalism, illuminating the potential impact 
of visual narratives. Furthermore, this paper seeks to introduce the concepts 
of peace photography and peace photojournalism into the lexicon of peace 
and conflict disciplines. 
 
0.4  Key Research Questions 
 
Key background questions in considering the visual media’s contribution to 
conflict resolution are as follows: 
 
• What is the model for Peace Journalism and to what extent does this 
incorporate the visual media? 
 
• How have visual media and more specifically, photojournalism, 
covered conflict in the past? Does photojournalism coverage change 
over time in parallel to a peace process? 
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• What impact does photojournalism have on the parties to the 
understanding and potential resolution of conflict? 
 
• How can visual media, specifically peace photojournalism, contribute 
to positive conflict transformation? 
 
Although this list is not exhaustive, exploring these questions offers potential 
opportunities to widen the scope of the field of Peace Journalism, by 
examining the current use and potential impact of visual media on war, 
peace-building and non-violent conflict resolution. 
 
0.5  Overview of Methodology 
 
As outlined earlier, this research seeks to analyze how news photographs fit 
within the model of Peace Journalism and contribute to processes of peace-
building and non-violent conflict resolution, through a content analysis of the 
media practices of national newspapers during the conflict of Northern 
Ireland, as expressed during the summer Orange Order Parades between 
1996 and 2000. 
 
To help address the underlying research questions, the present work will 
examine the photographic coverage of this conflict in Northern Ireland by 
conducting a content analysis of media practice in the use of photographs 
conveying the conflict and considering the visual narratives they provide for 
understanding, aggravating or contributing to its resolution. Several 
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methodological approaches will be employed. First, a literature review of 
previous research in the fields of media studies, journalism, and peace 
studies will evaluate any focus, or lack thereof, on visual media, prioritizing 
content analyses and interpretive models. Second, a content analysis will be 
undertaken of photographic images used by newspapers in Northern Ireland, 
The Republic of Ireland and Britain to communicate perceptions and 
understanding of the conflict, during their coverage of the 1996, 1998, and 
2000 Marching Seasons in Northern Ireland. Third, in extrapolating from 
previous research of audience surveys and theory, the research will consider 
the potential impact of these photographs on the conflict and further areas for 
audience impact as future research. Finally, this paper will include an 
analysis of the emerging field of visual methodology and consider how it may 
be used in peace and conflict research to contribute to a clearer 
understanding of the relationship between visual media and conflict 
resolution.  
 
0.6  Definitions and Concepts 
 
A number of concepts and definitions merit clarification as background to this 
research. 
As per Encarnacion et al. (1990),8 conflict signifies the pursuit of incompatible 
goals by different groups. This definition suggests a broader interval of time 
and a wider range of struggle than those of purely armed conflict. Usage of 
the term conflict will apply to any political conflict, whether it is pursued by 
                                                
8 (Encarnacion, McCartney, & Rosas, 1990) 
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peaceful means or by the use of force.9 Conflict resolution carries the more 
comprehensive implication that the deep-rooted sources of conflict are 
addressed and transformed. This definition implies that behaviour is no 
longer violent, attitudes are no longer hostile, and the structure of the conflict 
has been modified.10 
 
In some analyses, conflict transformation represents a significant extension 
of conflict resolution, but which in our view represents its deepest level. It 
describes a profound transformation in the institutions and discourses that 
perpetuate violence, as well as in the conflict parties themselves and in their 
relationships. It corresponds to the underlying tasks of structural and cultural 
peace building.11 Peace building underpins the work of peacemaking and 
peacekeeping by addressing structural issues and the long-term 
relationships between parties in conflict. With reference to the conflict triangle 
of Galtung, explained in the next chapter, it can be posited that peacemaking 
aims to change the attitudes of the main protagonists, peacekeeping lowers 
the level of destructive behaviour, and peace building tries to overcome the 
contradictions residing at the root of the conflict.12,13 
 
Peace Journalism was the term first coined by Johan Galtung, who set out a 
model for Peace Journalism that will be considered more closely in the next 
chapter. At this point, the following definition by Lynch and McGoldrick will 
suffice as a preliminary introduction: “Peace Journalism is when editors and 
                                                
9 Ibid, p.27 
10 Ibid, p.29 
11 Ibid, p.29 
12 Ibid, p.30 
13 (Johan Galtung & International Peace Research Institute., 1996), p.112 
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reporters make choices – of what stories to report and how to report them – 
that create opportunities for society at large to consider and value non-violent 
responses to conflict.” Building on this definition, this paper will introduce the 
term ‘Peace Photojournalism’ to describe the specific subset of practice of 
Peace Journalism that uses imagery to explain and ascribe meaning to 
conflicts: “when photographers and editors make choices in how they make, 
select and use the visual capture of conflict – in particular photography – in 
such a way as to limit the potential harmful effects of these images and to 
offer alternative images and explanations that exploit the potential 
opportunities for peaceful, non-violent conflict resolution.” 
 
0.7  Embracing “Peace Photography” 
 
 
 
“So we must fix our vision not merely on the negative expulsion of war, but 
on the positive affirmation of peace.” – Martin Luther King, Jr. 
 
 
Formulating the concept of ‘peace photojournalism’ is not purely an 
academic exercise. The sea of images of conflict that immerses us has a 
profound impact on our perception of the world, articulation of the ‘other’, and 
our potential for peace. For this reason, I suggest endorsing the term ‘peace 
photography’ which presents photographs and visual narratives in such 
manner to motivate us to think in new ways, challenging our perceptions and 
inspiring us to search for solutions to conflict. Following the tradition of peace 
journalism, peace photography – and the specialized discipline of peace 
photojournalism within it – emphasize context, minimize stereotypes and 
suggest solutions to the resolution of violent conflicts by peaceful means.  
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These often ‘unseen images’ characteristic of peace photojournalism may 
not sell newspapers, because they are not seen as sufficiently sensational or 
captivating, yet they have the potential to increase understanding of the 
‘other’, resolve conflict, build bridges between factions, and inspire us to 
make possible pathways to peace that are often dismissed as improbable. 
Ideally, these images should grace our headlines, offering attainable 
solutions and hope for the future. The goal of peace photojournalism is to 
advance everyday peace building through documenting the actions of 
citizenry to construct a more peaceful world, with emphasis on the following 
objectives: 
 
• To provide models of everyday behaviors that foster peace;  
 
• To highlight conflict resolution principles at a local level; 
 
• To underline the possibility for everyday ‘oases of peace’, even in 
situations where conflict and oppression are particularly pronounced; 
 
• To embrace the dynamic quality of human dignity and the spirit of 
peace; and 
 
• To inspire individuals to take personal responsibility for peace in their 
own lives. 
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The key to the evolution of peace photojournalism and to peace photography 
more generally, is to make the possibility of peace visible through the images 
we choose to capture and to exhibit. 
 
 
“… A thing is not seen because it is visible, but conversely, visible when it is 
seen.”  
– Plato 
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CHAPTER ONE – Conflict Resolution and Peace 
Journalism 
 
1.0 Introduction 
 
To consider the ways in which the media can contribute to conflict 
transformation, it is important to first review several key underlying elements 
from the field of conflict resolution and the emerging literature of Peace 
Journalism. 
 
1.1 Conflict Resolution 
 
In the late 1960s, Johan Galtung14,15 proposed an influential model of conflict 
that encompasses both symmetric and asymmetric conflicts. He depicted 
conflict as a triangle, with contradiction (C), attitude (A), and behaviour (B) at 
its vertices.16 Contradiction refers to the underlying conflict situation, which 
includes “the actual or perceived ‘incompatibility of goals’ between the 
conflict parties, which is generated by what Mitchell calls a ‘mis-match 
between social values and social structure’”.17 In a symmetric conflict, the 
parties, their interests, and the clash of interests between them define 
contradiction. In an asymmetric conflict, the parties, their relationship, and 
the conflict of interests inherent in the relationship define it.18 Attitude 
includes the parties’ perceptions and misperceptions of each other and of 
                                                
14 (J. Galtung, 1969) 
15 (Johan Galtung & International Peace Research Institute., 1996), p.72 
16 (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2011), p.10 
17 Ibid, p.10 
18 Ibid, p.10 
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themselves. These perceptions can be positive or negative, but “in violent 
conflicts parties tend to develop demeaning stereotypes of the other, and 
attitudes are often influenced by emotions such as fear, anger, bitterness and 
hatred”. Attitudes include also emotive (feeling), cognitive (belief) and 
conative (will) elements.19 
 
Galtung observes conflict as “a dynamic process in which structure, attitudes 
and behaviour are constantly changing and influencing one another”.20 All 
three components have to be present together in a full conflict.21 A “conflict 
structure without conflictual attitudes or behaviour is a latent (or structural) 
one”.22 Eventually, however, resolving the conflict necessitates the de-
escalation of conflictual behaviour, an attitudinal shift, and a transformation of 
the relationships at the core of the conflict structure.23 
 
Further, a distinction exists “between direct violence (e.g., children are 
murdered), structural violence (children die through poverty), and cultural 
violence (whatever binds us to this or seeks to justify it)”.24 Direct violence 
can be remedied by changing conflict behaviour, structural violence by 
removal of structural contradictions and injustices, and cultural violence by 
addressing attitudes.25 Peacekeeping, peace building and peacemaking 
relate to these concepts of change. Galtung also “defined ‘negative peace’ as 
                                                
19 Ibid, p.10 
20 Ibid, p.11 
21 Ibid, p.11 
22 Ibid, p.11 
23 Ibid, p.11 
24 Ibid, p.11 
25 Ibid, p.11 
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the cessation of direct violence and ‘positive peace’ as the overcoming of 
structural and cultural violence”.26 
 
Conflict as social change expresses the “heterogeneity of interests, values 
and beliefs that arise as new formations generated by social change come 
up against inherited constraints”. Our response to conflict depends however 
on habitual responses, which are amenable to change, as well as the 
exercise of intelligent choices.27 
 
Third-Party Intervention 
 
Hostility and escalation between two parties is easily fueled through 
feedback. The “entry of a third party may alter the conflict structure and allow 
a different pattern of communication to emerge, enabling the third party to 
filter or reflect back the messages, attitudes and behaviours” of the 
conflicting parties, curtailing this feedback.28 
 
Mediators have been often seen as ‘powerless’ – “their communications are 
powerful, but they bring to bear no new material resources of their own”. 
Such third parties can nevertheless influence not only the structure of 
communication but also the balance of power.29 In both respects, the media 
may potentially act as a third party, at least in terms of possessing the 
influence of ‘soft’ power. Hard power “has always been important in violent 
                                                
26 Ibid, p.11 
27 Ibid, p.17 
28 Ibid, pp.21 
29 Ibid, pp.21-22 
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conflict, but soft power may be more important in conflicts managed 
peacefully”.30 
 
Symmetric and Asymmetric Conflicts 
 
Conflicts of interest between relatively similar parties are examples of 
symmetric conflicts. In contrast, asymmetric conflicts arise between 
“dissimilar parties, such as conflicts between a majority and a minority, an 
established government and a group of rebels, a master and his servant, or 
an employer and her employees”.31 In such conflicts, “the root of the conflict 
lies not in particular issues or interests that may divide the parties, but in the 
very structure of who they are and the relationship between them. It may be 
that this structure of roles and relationships cannot be changed without 
conflict”.32 The third party facilitates this transformation, confronting the party 
with most power, availing itself of non-coercive strategies.33 In this role, 
media could objectively influence asymmetrical conflicts, by transforming 
previously non-peaceful or unbalanced relationships into peaceful ones.34 
 
New Developments in Conflict Resolution 
 
Classical conflict resolution has been mainly concerned with entry into 
conflict itself and enabling parties in violent conflict to resolve the issues 
between them in non-violent ways. A contemporary approach is to adopt a 
                                                
30 Ibid, p.22 
31 Ibid, p.24 
32 Ibid, p.24 
33 Ibid, p.24 
34 Ibid, p.24 
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broader view of “the timing and nature of intervention”.35 The new patterns of 
major armed conflict that became prominent in the 1990s suggested the 
need for a more nuanced model of conflict emergence and transformation. In 
this model, conflict formations arise from “social change, leading to a process 
of violent or non-violent transformation, and resulting in further social change 
in which hitherto suppressed or marginalized individuals or groups come to 
articulate their interests and challenge existing norms and power 
structures”.36 As a consequence, the scope of third-party intervention has 
been differentiated and broadened.  
 
Lederach’s (1997) model, consisting of levels of conflict resolution and 
conflict transformation, emphasized “‘bottom-up’ processes and the 
suggestion that the middle level can serve to link the remaining two levels”.37 
Encarnacion et al. have formulated models of third-party intervention to 
highlight the way in which “external parties may become core parties” with 
increasing involvement, and “to emphasize the importance of ‘embedded 
parties’ from inside the conflict who often play key roles in expediting moves 
toward conflict resolution”.38 A general trend has been a shift from regarding 
“third-party intervention as the primary responsibility of external agencies 
towards appreciating the role of internal ‘third parties’ or indigenous 
peacemakers”. This transition suggests the replacement of individual track 
models with a multi-track model, in which emphasis is placed on the 
importance of indigenous resources and local actors. In dynamic terms, 
depending on the stage reached in the conflict, the overall aim is to work to 
                                                
35 Ibid, p.26 
36 Ibid, p.26 
37 Ibid, p.26 
38 Ibid, p.26 
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prevent the narrowing of political space associated with conflict escalation 
and to promote the expansion of political space associated with conflict de-
escalation and transformation.39 
 
Of particular note, the aim of conflict resolution is not the elimination of 
conflict, as evident in Curle’s model of the transformation of asymmetric 
conflicts, which is even sometimes “undesirable”.40 Rather, conflict resolution 
serves to transform actually or potentially violent conflict into “peaceful (non-
violent) processes of social and political change”.41 
 
Edward Azar’s Theory of Protracted Social Conflict (PSC) 
 
With the concept of ‘protracted social conflict’, the sources of such conflict lay 
predominantly within, as well as across, rather than between states.42 
Drawing on the work of Sumner (1906), Gurr (1970), Mitchell (1981), and 
others, Azar traced the process by which mutually exclusionary “experiences, 
fears and belief systems” generate “reciprocal negative images which 
perpetuate communal antagonisms and solidify protracted social conflict”.43 
Antagonistic group histories, exclusionist myths, demonizing propaganda and 
dehumanizing ideologies are deployed to justify discriminatory policies and 
legitimize atrocities. In a dynamic known as the “security dilemma”, actions in 
such circumstances are mutually interpreted in the most threatening light: 
“the worst motivations tend to be attributed to the other side”, the capacity for 
                                                
39 Ibid, pp.28-29 
40 Ibid, p.32 
41 Ibid, p.32 
42 (Azar, 1990), p.15 
43 (Encarnacion et al., 1990), p.88 
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compromise and accommodation contracts, and “proposals for political 
solutions become rare, and tend to be perceived on all sides as mechanisms 
for gaining relative power and control”.44 In this vein, this threatening dynamic 
gives rise to inhospitable images of “the other’. 
 
1.2 Peace Journalism 
 
What is Peace Journalism? 
 
The original Peace Journalism model was set out, and presented in tabular 
form, by Professor Johan Galtung, a founder of the academic subject of 
Peace Studies and the set of analytical and fieldwork methods known as 
Peace Research. Peace Journalism is a growing discipline within numerous 
university courses – Conflict and Peace Studies, Media and Communications 
Studies, Development Studies, International Relations, and of course all 
branches of Journalism.45 Essential differences between Peace Journalism 
and War Journalism are outlined in the following table46:  
 
 
 
                                                
44 (Azar, 1990), p.15 
45 (Johan Galtung & International Peace Research Institute., 1996), p.195 
46 (Johan Galtung & International Peace Research Institute., 1996) 
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PEACE/CONFLICT 
JOURNALISM 
 
WAR/VIOLENCE JOURNALISM 
I. PEACE/CONFLICT-ORIENTED 
 
Explore conflict formation, x parties, y goals, z 
issues general ‘win, win’ orientation 
 
Open space, open time; causes and outcomes 
anywhere, also in history/culture 
 
Making conflicts transparent 
 
Giving voice to all parties; empathy, 
understanding 
 
See conflict/war as problem, focus on conflict 
creativity 
 
Humanization of all sides; more so the worse the 
weapon 
 
Proactive: prevention before any violence/war 
occurs 
 
Focus on invisible effects of violence (trauma 
and glory, damage to structure/culture) 
 
I. WAR/VIOLENCE-ORIENTED 
 
Focus on conflict arena, 2 parties, 1 goal (win), 
war general zero-sum orientation 
 
Closed space, closed time; causes and exists 
in arena, who threw the first stone 
 
Making wars opaque/secret 
 
‘Us-them’ journalism, propaganda, voice, for 
‘us’ 
 
See ‘them’ as the problem, focus on who 
prevails in war 
 
Dehumanization of ‘them’; more so the worse 
the weapon 
 
Reactive: waiting for violence before reporting 
 
 
Focus only on visible effect of violence (killed, 
wounded and material damage) 
II.  TRUTH-ORIENTED 
 
Expose untruths on all sides/ uncover all cover-
ups 
 
II. PROPAGANDA-ORIENTED 
 
Expose ‘their’ untruths/ help ‘our’ cover-
ups/lies 
III. PEOPLE-ORIENTED 
 
Focus on suffering all over; on women, aged, 
children, giving voice to the voiceless 
 
Give name to all evil-doers 
 
Focus on people peace-makers 
 
III. ELITE-ORIENTED 
 
Focus on ‘our’ suffering; on able-bodied elite 
males, being their mouth-piece 
 
Give name of their evil-doers 
 
Focus on elite peace-makers 
IV. SOLUTION-ORIENTED 
 
Peace = non-violence + creativity 
 
Highlight peace initiatives, also to prevent more 
war 
 
Focus on structure, culture, the peaceful society 
 
Aftermath: resolution, reconstruction, 
reconciliation 
 
IV. VICTORY-ORIENTED 
 
Peace = victory  + ceasefire 
 
Conceal peace initiatives, before victory is at 
hand 
 
 
Focus on treaty, institution, the controlled 
society 
 
Leaving for another war, return if the old flares 
up again 
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As elaborated by Johan Galtung,47,48 Peace Journalism is often 
misunderstood as ‘advocating peace’. In fact, ‘giving peace a chance’ in 
national and international debates, by ensuring that non-violent responses to 
conflict receive fair consideration, would be a more constructive vantage.49 
Limitations in the manner in which news is reported are systemic and 
diminish consideration of non-violent conflict resolution. Such shortcomings 
result from the application of well-established reporting conventions, 
embedded in the values and practices of journalism, which are linked, in turn, 
with underlying and often unchallenged concepts of both news and conflict.50 
The Peace Journalism model offers a basis for identifying and rethinking 
these concepts, values and practices alike. 
 
Peace Journalism results from editors and reporters making choices – in 
particular, the stories to report and the approach to reporting them – that 
create opportunities for society to consider and value non-violent responses 
to conflict. Peace Journalism: 
 
• Uses the insights of conflict analysis and transformation to update the 
concepts of balance, fairness and accuracy in reporting 
 
• Provides a new route map tracing the connection between journalists, 
their sources, the stories they cover and the consequences of their 
journalism – the ethics of journalistic intervention 
                                                
47 (J. Galtung, 1969) 
48 (Johan Galtung & International Peace Research Institute., 1996), p.72 
49 Ibid, p.xxi 
50 Ibid, p.5 
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• Builds an awareness of non-violence and creativity into the practical 
job of everyday editing and reporting. 
 
Peace Journalism can be seen as a set of tools, both conceptual and 
practical, intended to equip journalists to offer a better public service. It 
intersects within and around media in many parts of the world, over issues of 
representation and context. 
 
Avoiding War Journalism 
 
News organisations and journalists do not generally examine the 
assumptions underlying many of their common decisions in their reporting or 
their impact in shaping public understanding – let alone their influence over 
the actions and motivations of parties to the conflict.51 News values – the set 
of precepts guiding professional journalists in their work as gatekeepers to 
legitimate news stories – vary in content, source, and process for their 
establishment. When patterns in reporting can be discerned, such as when 
the elements omitted are always, or usually, the same, researchers can 
gather evidence of news values, enabling them to deduce the criteria by 
which the journalists render their gatekeeping decisions.52 
 
Pernicious elements of War Journalism often constrain the coverage of 
conflict. An important example was the cover of Newsweek magazine that 
                                                
51 Ibid, p.196 
52 Ibid, pp.196-7 
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framed a conflict as a bipolar state, similar to a tug of war, underpinning all 
the other issues.53 In such instances, readers and audiences are led – or left, 
by crucial omissions in the reporting – to overvalue violent or reactive 
responses to conflict issues, and to undervalue non-violent, developmental 
ones. Audiences may also be uninformed of fundamental contraindications to 
assertions in support of violence, or they are led to attach little significance to 
them. 
 
War Journalism – in particular, the patterns of omission and marginalization 
that have been identified in the way news organizations respond to many 
conflicts – cannot be explained solely as a “reflect[ion of] the perspectives 
and interests” of those in charge of them.54 If we assume that War 
Journalism predominates because it reflects the interests of the media-
owning class, then it is conceivable that this class has a predominant interest 
in violence as a response to conflict.55 To avoid the pitfalls posed by these 
patterns of omission and marginalization, a different, more informative 
strategy is required.56 
 
A 17-point plan for practical Peace Journalism 
 
To formulate and implement such a strategy, the following points have been 
suggested to re-balance the reporting of conflicts, while countering the 
distorting or often unexamined influence of War Journalism. 
 
                                                
53 Ibid, p.28 
54 Ibid, p.200 
55 Ibid, p.197 
56 Ibid, p.28 
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  AVOID  INSTEAD 
 
1 Portraying a conflict as consisting of only two 
parties contesting the same goal(s). The 
logical outcome is for one to win and the 
other to lose. 
Try to DISAGGREGATE the two parties into 
many smaller groups, with many needs and 
interests, pursuing many goals, opening up 
more creative potential for a range of 
outcomes. And ask yourself – who else is 
involved, and how? 
 
2 Avoid accepting stark distinctions between 
‘self’ and ‘other’. These can be used to build 
the sense that another party is a ‘threat’ or 
‘beyond the pale’ of civilized behaviour. Both 
are key justifications for violence. 
Seek the ‘other’ in the ‘self’ and vice versa. If a 
party is presenting itself as ‘the goodies’, ask 
questions about how different its behaviour 
really is to that it ascribes to the other – isn’t it 
ashamed of itself? 
 
3 Treating a conflict as if it is only going on in 
the place and at the time that violence is 
occurring 
Try to trace the links and consequences for 
people in other places now and in the future. 
Ask: 
• Who are all the people with a stake in 
the outcome? 
• How do these stakeholders relate to 
each other? 
• Who gains from the conflict? 
• What are they doing to influence the 
conflict? 
• What will happen if…? 
• What lessons will people draw from 
watching these events unfold as part 
of a global audience? How will enter 
the calculations of parties to future 
conflicts near and far? 
 
4 Assessing the merits of a violent action or 
policy of violence in terms of its visible 
effects only. 
Try to find ways of reporting on the invisible 
effects, e.g., The long-term consequences of 
psychological damage and trauma, perhaps 
increasing the likelihood that those affected 
will be violent in future, either against other 
people or, as a group, against other groups or 
other countries. 
 
5 Avoid letting parties define themselves by 
simply quoting their leaders restatements of 
familiar demands or positions.  
Enquire for yourself into goals, needs and 
interests;  
• How are people on the ground 
affected by the conflict in everyday 
life? 
• What do they want changed? 
• Who else is speaking up for them 
besides their political leaders? 
Answers to this are often surprisingly 
accessible as even many small 
grassroots organizations now have 
websites. 
• Is the position stated by their leaders 
the only way or the best way to 
achieve the changes they want? 
• This may help to empower parties to 
clarify their needs and interests and 
articulate their goals, making creative 
outcomes more likely. 
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6 Concentrating always on what divides the 
parties, on the differences between what 
each say they want. 
Try asking questions that may reveal areas of 
common ground, and leading your report with 
answers that suggest that at least some goals, 
needs and interests may be compatible, or 
shared. 
 
7 Only reporting the violent acts and 
describing ‘the horror’. If you exclude 
everything else, you suggest that the only 
explanation for violence is previous violence 
(revenge); the only remedy, more violence 
(coercion/punishment). 
 
Show how people have been blocked and 
frustrated or deprived in everyday life as a way 
of explaining how the conditions for violence 
are being produced.  
8 Blaming someone ‘starting it’. Try looking at how shared problems and 
issues are leading to consequences which all 
the parties say they never intended. 
 
9 Focusing on exclusively on the suffering, 
fears and grievances of only one party. This 
divides the parties into ‘villains’ and ‘victims’ 
and suggests that coercing or punishing the 
villains represents a solution. 
 
Treat as equally newsworthy the suffering, 
fears and grievances of all parties. 
10 ‘Victimizing’ language like ‘devastated’, 
‘defenseless’, ‘pathetic’, ‘tragedy’ which only 
tells us what has been done to and could be 
done for a group of people by others. This is 
disempowering and limits the options for 
change. 
 
Report on what has been done and could be 
done by the people. Don’t just ask them how 
they feel; also ask them how they are coping 
and what they think. Can they suggest any 
solutions? 
11 The imprecise use of emotive words to 
describe what has happened to people, such 
as the following: 
• ‘tragedy’ is a form of drama, 
originally Greek in which someone’s 
fault or weakness ultimately proves 
his or her undoing. 
• ‘assassination’ is the murder of the 
head of state. 
• ‘massacre’ is the deliberate killing of 
people known to be unarmed and 
defenseless. Are we sure? Or do we 
not know? Might these people have 
died in battle? 
• ‘systematic’ – e.g., Raping, or 
forcing people from their homes. 
Has it really been organized in a 
deliberate pattern, or have there 
been a number of unrelated, albeit 
extremely nasty, incidents? 
 
Always be precise about what we know. Do 
not minimize suffering but reserve the 
strongest language for the gravest situations 
or you will beggar the language and help to 
justify disproportionate responses that 
escalate the violence. 
12 Demonizing adjectives like ‘vicious’, ‘cruel’, 
‘brutal’, and ‘barbaric’. These always 
describe one parties' view of what another 
party has done. To use them puts the 
journalist on that side and helps to justify an 
escalation of violence. 
Report what you know about the wrongdoing 
and give as much information as you can 
about the reliability of other people’s reports or 
descriptions of it. If it is still be investigated, 
say so, as a caution that the truth may not yet 
be known. 
 
13 Demonizing labels like ‘terrorist’, ‘extremist’, 
‘fanatic’, and ‘fundamentalist’. These are 
Try calling people by the names they give 
themselves. Or be more precise in your 
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always given by ‘us’ to ‘them’. No one ever 
uses them to describe himself or herself. 
And they are difficult, if not impossible, to 
apply impartially in every instance where 
they would be warranted. In practice, 
therefore, to use such labels is to take sides. 
They also generally mean the people labeled 
are unreasonable, which weakens the case 
for reasoning (negotiating) with them. 
 
descriptions – e.g., ‘bombers’ and, for the 
attacks of September 11th, ‘suicide hijackers’ 
are both less partisan and give more 
information than ‘terrorists’. 
14 Focusing exclusively on the human rights 
abuses, misdemeanors and wrongdoings of 
only one side. 
Try to name all wrongdoers, and treat 
allegations made by all parties in a conflict 
equally seriously. This means, not taking at 
face value, but instead making equal efforts to 
establish whether any evidence exists to back 
them up, treating the victims with equal 
respect and the finding and punishing of all 
wrongdoers as being of equal importance. 
 
15 Making an opinion or claim seem like an 
established fact. This is how propaganda 
works – e.g., The campaign, primarily aimed 
at US and UK media, to link Saddam 
Hussein to ‘international terrorism’ in early 
2002 under a headline linking Iraq to the 
Taliban and al-Qaeda, came the claim that 
‘Iraqi military intelligence officers are said to 
be assisting extreme Palestinian groups in 
attacks on Israel…’.  ‘Said to be’ obscures 
the question of who is doing the saying. See 
also ‘thought to be’, ‘it’s being seen as’, etc. 
 
Tell your readers or your audience who said 
what. That way you avoid implicitly signing up 
yourself and your news service to the 
allegations made by one party in the conflict 
against another.  
16 Greeting the signing of documents of leaders 
that bring about military victory or ceasefire 
as necessarily creating peace.  
Try to report on the issues that remain, and on 
the needs and interests of those affected. 
What has to happen in order to remove 
incentives for further acts of violence?  
 
Ask what is being done to strengthen the 
means on the ground to handle and resolve 
conflict non-violently, to address development 
or structural needs in the society and to create 
a culture of peace? 
 
17 Waiting for leaders on ‘our’ side to suggest 
or offer solutions. 
Pick up and explore peace initiatives wherever 
they cone from. Ask questions of politicians – 
e.g., About ideas put forward by grassroots 
organizations. Assess peace perspectives 
against what you know about the issues the 
parties are really trying to address; do not 
simply ignore them because they do not 
coincide with established positions. Include 
images of a solution, however partial or 
fragmentary – they may help to stimulate 
dialogue. 
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In the past decade, further work has demonstrated an ongoing need for a 
shift in the dominant mode of coverage from ‘peace/conflict’ to ‘war/violence’, 
while contrasting the elements between these two modes.57,58,59  
 
 
Reflecting or constructing? 
 
We have observed that the fundamental role of journalism is ideally 
understood as playing a part in constructing the world around it – forming 
realities and shaping discussion of events. This point is not merely 
semantic.60 Indeed, the tendency of War Journalism to portray violence as its 
own cause, devoid of context, invites further violence as an appropriate 
solution to conflict.61 Most US media reported the ‘9/11’ attacks as a ‘bolt 
from the blue’, whilst shouting down anyone attempting to contextualize them. 
 
Advocating an alternate response – non-violent action based on co-operation 
to uphold international law – requires first reckoning with War Journalism, as 
its approach is that any initiative that is not unequivocally ‘winning’ risks 
being reported as ‘losing’ or ‘backing down’. A violent response – with a 
matching strategy of propaganda – is often argued as a more certain bet.62 
Parties to conflict factor the impact of War Journalism into their interests and 
perspectives and developing their policies and propaganda. War Journalism 
and war propaganda are coterminous. Understanding the origins of news 
                                                
57 (Lynch, 2008) 
58 (Lynch, 2015) 
59 (Keeble, Tulloch, & Zollmann, 2010) 
60 (Johan Galtung & International Peace Research Institute., 1996), p.200 
61 Ibid, p.201 
62 Ibid, p.201 
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values or reporting conventions in a conflict, especially how and why they 
arise, is thus necessary. 
 
The liberal theory of press freedom 
 
One of the most eloquent exponents of liberal theory was the nineteenth-
century British philosopher John Stuart Mills.63 In this theory’s framework, the 
free flow of information – especially if it brings about a collision of competing 
perspectives – is not only intrinsically valuable, but is also defensible on a 
utilitarian basis, as a service that strengthens the function of society. The 
growth of media thus conferred societal good but also carried major 
implications for the integrity of its reporting conventions.  
 
The growth of mass media 
 
With the pressures underlying the growth and changes of media, the 
essential nature of journalism also changed, to ensure its commercial viability. 
Niche marketing gave way to mass marketing. At one time, journalism readily 
dismissed its adherents, or absorbed a relatively small, local constituency in 
their own distinct concerns. In its commercial expansion, media agencies 
needed to refrain from marginalizing or perturbing any of its potential 
customers.64 Hence the rise of what we now regard as Journalistic Objectivity 
(throughout the rest of this chapter, we denote it with a capital ‘O’) as an 
industry standard describes in fact a set of conventions that serve to present 
                                                
63 Ibid, p.201 
64 Ibid, p.202 
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the news as ‘all things to all people’ – or, at least, to satisfy stakeholders with 
sufficient capital to purchase the coverage.65 
 
Journalistic Objectivity – the big ‘O’ 
 
Objectivity, as an ethos in journalism, was a phenomenon of the 
Enlightenment, during which the necessary political, economic and social 
changes were imbricated.66 Variably defined, such objectivity conferred a 
considerable commercial advantage on news reporting as a commodity. 
Journalism imbued with objectivity would be less likely to disquiet potential 
consumers among the educated classes, with the emergence of political 
dispensations that followed Enlightenment-inspired reforms and upheavals. 
Therefore, most consumers would likely find such journalism palatable. 
 
For any news event, the initial decision of reporters and editors relates to 
their role as gatekeepers: why should they cover a particular story, rather 
than another? The second question is then: why this source, and not 
another? As the methodology of objective journalism became industrial 
convention, this second issue was mollified by the practice of indexing – 
projecting such source decisions on to an external frame of reference that 
was not, apparently, selected by the journalist.67 
 
 
 
                                                
65 Ibid, p.203 
66 Ibid, p.203 
67 Ibid, p.203 
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Official Sources 
 
In practice, indexing often meant tracking the agenda set by official sources – 
governments, police, the courts, financial authorities, and similar bodies.68 
Interpretation of which facts are most meaningful for a given event on a 
particular day is subjective but is often presented as having been made on a 
seemingly ‘neutral’ basis. Such news values are deeply embedded in both 
the systems and the practice of media agency.69 As a consequence, bias in 
favour of official sources remains probably the single most widespread 
convention in coverage of global news.70 
                                                
68 Ibid, p.203 
69 Ibid, p.204 
70 Ibid, p.204 
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Chapter Two – Photojournalism 
 
“Ultimately, photography is subversive not when is frightens, repels,  
or even stigmatizes, but when it is pensive, when it thinks.”  
-- Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida 
 
2.0 Introduction 
 
The photograph “communicates by means of its association with some 
hidden, or implicit text” – “a system of hidden linguistic propositions”.71 
Sontag argued that the photograph can be treated as “narrowly selective 
transparency”.72 As a discourse, photographs provide “a system within which 
the culture harnesses photographs to various representational tasks”.73 
 
In contrast, photojournalists themselves have traditionally “ascribe[d] to a 
formal code of naturalism”.74 Naturalism “refers to a communicative strategy 
which seeks to obscure the articulatory apparatus utilized in the production of 
a message, diminishing the perceived presence of an author and the 
significance of intent or point of view”.75  However, while “an event has come 
to mean … something worth photographing”, it is “ideology … that 
determines what constitute[s] an event”. Sontag emphasizes that the moral 
impact of photographs depends on “the existence of a relevant political 
consciousness”.76 
 
 
                                                
71 (Sekula & Burgin, 1982), p.85 
72 (Sontag, 1990), p.6 
73 (Sekula & Burgin, 1982), p.87 
74 (Schwartz, 1992), p.107 
75 Ibid, p.97 
76 (Sontag, 1990), pp.18-9 
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2.1 Photography and Photojournalism Theory 
 
A distinctive characteristic of the photo is that it isolates a singular moment;77 
yet a solitary photograph can extend and replicate the human image to the 
level of mass production.78 Human photography is a collective act: it cannot 
be created alone. In this manner, we discovered in the photograph the 
capacity for visual report without syntax.79 Indeed, photography reflects 
instantaneously the external world, delivering a perfectly replicable image.80 
Indeed, “images are more real than anyone could have supposed”.81 
 
However, to accept the convention that “the camera cannot lie” is merely to 
reinforce multiple misrepresentations.82 As stated by Schwartz, “the history of 
photojournalism helps explain the rhetorical stance that contemporary 
photojournalists and editors are adopting. The strategic elevation of 
recording above expression, of fact above art, that emerged along with the 
commercial press has encouraged denial of the constructed, authored nature 
of photographic representations”.83 Education might seem the optimal 
approach to counter the misconceptions propagated in the media; yet, to 
date, little education or resources have been available to challenge the new 
media on their own terms.84 We lack sufficient “literacy” that crosses various 
media, beyond individual narrowly defined enterprises. We are consequently 
poorly equipped to respond to the effect of dramatic changes in media 
                                                
77 (Barthes, 1981), p.204 
78 Ibid, p.205 
79 Ibid, p.206 
80 Ibid, p.206 
81 (Sontag, 1990), p.180 
82 (Barthes, 1981), p.209 
83 (Schwartz, Bonnie, & Hanno, 1999), p.180 
84 (Barthes, 1981), p.211 
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coverage that have resulted from new hybrids and inter-disciplinary forms of 
media coverage.85 In the age of the image, for instance, language assumes a 
graphic or iconic character, whose “meaning” belongs little to the semantic 
universe, and not at all to the republic of letters.86 
 
To grasp the meaning of the photograph, we may adopt a perspective of 
‘accelerated transience’.87 That is, by emphasizing the transience of our 
environment, the photograph can alter our perceptions of temporal 
relationships, aging issues or symbols or relegating them to a past that may 
in fact be recent or still carry relevance. This perspective can risk 
accentuating negative effects of the photograph. Speeding up a temporal 
sequence is to abolish time, much as the telegraph and cable abolished 
space. The photograph can abolish both such aspects, which can have 
positive results as well.88 For instance, this accelerated sequence can 
eradicate our national frontiers and cultural barriers, involving us in The 
Family of Man, regardless of any particular worldview. In this vein, a 
photograph of a group of people of any hue is simply a picture of people, not 
of “colored people”.89 Similarly, observing a photograph of a local slum 
renders its conditions unbearable.90 As a result, the world itself becomes a 
sort of museum of objects that have been encountered before in some other 
medium.91 This function provides the political rationale for the photograph.92 
To some extent, however, all media permeates our lives with artificial 
                                                
85 Ibid, p.212 
86 Ibid, p.213 
87 Ibid, p.213 
88 Ibid, p.213 
89 Ibid, pp.213-4 
90 Ibid, p.214 
91 Ibid, p.215 
92 Ibid, p.214 
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perception and arbitrary values,93 and can also desensitize us to the realities 
of the world depicted in the visual media.94 
 
Just as photography has been long regarded as “the visual medium best 
suited to take up the mantle of objectivity”,95 photojournalism is similarly 
presented as “an objective record of reality for viewers”96 and a “vision of the 
world easily consumed and digested”.97 News images of ‘the other’, as 
portrayed in conflicts, are however not objective but are “socially constructed 
artifacts”.98 Journalistic objectivity as a whole may be in fact shown to be a 
“social construct”.99 Many lines of evidence support the observation that 
“photographers interpret reality rather than record it”.100 Images are socially 
constructed through our decisions to create (e.g.,, photograph) and to publish 
them, in the institutional context of the mass media producing the 
photographs.101 In particular, images are often selected to “illustrate reporters’ 
stories”, and “a clear parallel can be found between the kinds of [print] stories 
newspapers run and the kinds of images staff photographers produce”.102 
Not only do “photographs encode a photographer’s point of view”, 
“institutional requirements [constrain] his or her activities” in producing those 
images.103 
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96 (Schwartz, 1992), p.107 
97 Ibid, p.108 
98 Ibid, p.97 
99 Ibid, p.95 
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Further, “photo texts give clear instructions detailing how a news event 
should be photographed in order to produce the most complete narrative re-
telling”,104 with further influence exerted by “pre-conceived storyboards”.105 
Even when photojournalists approach the creation of their actual images with 
objectivity,106 the ultimate choice of photographic subject matter in its 
publication by mass media is most seminal to how we understand a conflict 
and a peace process. Indeed, “comparing the characteristics attributed to 
photographs produced in differing institutional contexts suggests the 
important role the institutions themselves play in fixing public perceptions of 
photographic representations.107 
 
The circumstances under which the depiction of victims in conflict may be 
effective and influence state policy forms a salient and unanswered 
question.108 Journalistic selection of images primarily depicting violence and 
aggression can otherwise carry negative consequences that impede peace 
building and the resolution of conflict, or our understanding of the conflict. 
While “photographs cannot create a moral position … they can reinforce one  
– and can help build a nascent one”.109 
 
2.2 War Photography  
 
In war and conflict circumstances, photographic material portrays a cycle of 
violence. War Journalism depicts “violence as its own cause, stripped of 
                                                
104 Ibid, p.99 
105 Ibid, p.102 
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107 Ibid, pp.160-161 
108 (Shaw, 1996), p.178 
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context” and “invites the presentation of more violence as an appropriate 
remedy”.110 McGoldrick and Lynch explain further that the defining aspects of 
War Journalism “lead us … to overvalue violent, reactive responses to 
conflict, and undervalue non-violent, development ones”.111 As with the 
printed press of War Journalism, ‘War Photography’ may similarly omit, 
distort, or marginalize the material facts of a conflict, with “news 
organizations respond[ing] to so many conflicts” in these flawed or limited 
ways.112 McGoldrick and Lynch113 expand on the tension between War 
Journalism and peaceful alternatives:  
 
Anyone tempted to advocate responses such as this – non-violent, 
based on co-operation to uphold international law – would have to 
reckon with War Journalism, since it means anything that is no 
unequivocally ‘winning’ risks being reported as ‘losing’ or ‘backing 
down’. To argue for a violent response – and devise a propaganda 
strategy to match – is, in that sense, a safer bet.  
 
Drawing on research experience in conflicts, Varis explains that the 
“structural factors and force of events facing the journalist in such a situation 
are more powerful in determining the journalist’s behavior and reporting than 
are the rules and procedures he brings with him”.114 Moreover, “most 
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traditions of communication research are war-oriented rather than peace-
motivated”,115 which applies certainly to War Photography.  
 
2.3 Visual Narratives, Objectivity and the ‘Other’ 
 
According to Harrison, most textbooks of research methodology prior to this 
century contained little discussion of ‘visual methodology’.116 Visual 
methodology describes any research design that uses any visual evidence, 
which may be produced by researchers or others.117 Only rarely is the visual 
material the sole data.118 
 
Addressing the past neglect of visual methodology, numerous recent texts 
have reviewed visual material (such as Evans & Hall, 1999; Hall, 1997; Rose, 
2001) and visual methodology (for example, Banks, 2001; Emmison & Smith, 
2000; Pink, 2001; Prosser, 1998a), as referenced by Harrison.119 Most 
research studies that deployed visual images or visual technologies 
transposed images into words, distinguishing the topic of study from the 
forms of analysis of images (for example, Chaplin, 1994).120 This limitation 
arose because cameras or images were used as a resource for, rather than 
the topic of, studies.121 
 
To use visual material within a narrative or an investigation, we must 
examine if, and to what extent, the visual can be used to construct narratives, 
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its relationship to or dependence on written or verbal narration, and the 
manner in which visual narratives can provide us with data on experience.122 
These questions are addressed in the latter part of this paper. A related 
matter is the justification for omitting visual evidence from publication.123 
 
A second consideration is the importance of understanding the ways in which 
the visual ‘works’.124 To borrow Berger’s phrase,125 photography is primarily 
about the “ways of seeing”. Others, such as Barthes (1981),126 posit that the 
symbolic forms of photographs – or indeed all forms of imagery – express the 
experience of others and can elicit discussion of that experience.127 
 
Photographic images carry a material and symbolic significance that serve as 
important modes of communication in social relations.128 For the investigator, 
reflexivity between the image and the verbal response – or, generally, 
another expression – produces the data.129 In Harrison’s work, we observe 
an erosion in the marginal nature of visual methodology, supplanted by a 
body of work in which researchers have used photography as a form of data 
for their work.130 However, the possibility of visual narratives may need to 
encompass the idea that other forms of narration are essential to the 
realization of the context, content and meaning of the visual.131 
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2.4 Peace Journalism and Photography 
 
Peace Journalism can be defined as the form of journalism in which “editors 
and reporters make choices – of what stories to report and about how to 
report them – that create opportunities for society at large to consider and 
value non-violent responses to conflict”.132 Peace Journalism arose as a 
“model for identifying and predicting patterns of omission and distortion in 
conflict coverage”.133 Patterns of omission and distortion “not only lead us, or 
leave us, to overvalue reactive, violent responses – and to undervalue 
developmental, non-violent ones”.134 It has served also to extend coverage of 
political “policy options beyond ‘pre-emptive war’ and ‘regime change’”.135  
 
Photojournalism rose to prominence during the Second World War,136 
serving primarily the development of wars and conflict. Wolfsfeld has noted 
that no major studies have examined the role of the news media in an 
ongoing peace process.137 Similarly, none have evaluated the role of 
photography in news media coverage of peace.  
 
2.5 Visual Methodology and Content Analysis 
 
Broadly, social research of images applies three sets of questions: (i) what is 
the image of, or what is its content?; (ii) who took or produced the image, and 
when and why did they produce it?; and (iii) how do other people come to 
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have the image, how do they interpret it, and what do they do with it? Some 
of these questions are resolved by social research.138 
 
Visual researchers in the social sciences commonly claim that theirs is a 
minority field that is poorly understood and appreciated (e.g.,, Grady 1991; 
Prosser 1998b; cf. MacDougall 1997).139 Seeing is not natural, despite our 
perceptions in this regard. As for all sensory experiences, the interpretation 
of sight is culturally and historically specific (e.g., Classen 1993).140 Equally 
unnatural are the representations derived from vision – such as drawings, 
paintings, films, and photographs.141 While images are detected on the retina 
and interpreted continually by the brain, our second-order representations 
when we paint on canvas or animal skin, or when we open the shutter on a 
camera, carry discrete, specific intentions.142 In particular, we may 
understand the content of an image, but may fail to grasp or disregard the 
reason for which the image exists. Our initial understanding or interpretation 
of visual images can even be pre-formulated.143 To understand the basis for 
an image, we must move beyond its content and examine the image as an 
object.144 Re-examining images from a distance and interrogating them is 
essential to acquiring a broader perspective of their relevance.145 
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Our vision and assessment of visual material is often contextual or 
conditional, thus not universally applicable.146 This limitation is typically 
imposed by language, as evident among cultures in which language 
predominates.147 For example, the contexts of images in Euro-American 
societies are strongly influenced by language – both oral and written.148 
Displacing the visual from its original or local context defined by place and 
time, as well as constraining the visual to the domain of ‘art’, also limit the 
context of other images and thus their potential utility.149 Even the concept of 
‘reading’ a photograph simply invokes a term typically ascribed to the written 
word.150 
 
Images and their elements do not however possess their own ‘language’, in 
absolute or socially specific terms.151 Although images can carry particular 
meanings in a given society or culture, these meanings are usually highly 
dependent upon context and are impermanent.152 The properties of images, 
and our interpretation of them, are also not immutable.153 Moreover, ‘reading’ 
a photograph implies that the ‘message’ can be discerned from the visual 
image alone, as if spoken; however, actual speech occurs between people 
through their social relationships.154 
 
The internal narrative of a photograph refers to the story conveyed by the 
content of an image. That narrative is not necessarily congruent with the 
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narrative that the image-maker intended to tell; in fact, these two stories can 
often be markedly disparate.155 The external narrative consists of information 
regarding the nature of the world that extends beyond that of the photograph. 
Although they may be opposed, the external and internal narratives are 
interconnected in practice and share similar elements. Indeed, “consciously 
and unconsciously, critically and uncritically, we all – observers and observed 
– slip easily between reading internal and external narratives of images”.156 
 
Robust visual research demands a careful analysis of both the internal and 
external narratives.157 Within all societies, visual practice is not only an 
“embedded social practice” but is also likely to be embedded in many 
different ways.158 A broader form of analysis is important to understanding 
these narratives, including an appraisal of the external narrative that “goes 
beyond the visual text itself”, such as a caption or accompanying text.159 In 
some cases, the ability of the photographic image to communicate multiple 
narratives is not so much confined by the caption and context as rendered 
impertinent.160  This problem occurs in the use of some photographs in 
newspapers, as in the illustrations of a story that concern a person or a topic 
with which the reader may be unfamiliar.161 In other instances, film, videotape 
and photography in social research can perform functions that are not solely 
introductory or illustrative, but seek to express insights about society.162 A 
major difficulty in social research is the challenge in visually depicting the 
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conditions of human existence and similar abstract themes, clearly and 
without generalization.163 Although material objects are readily illustrated in 
images, creating or selecting a visual image that illustrates an abstract 
concept – such as ‘society’, ‘culture’, ‘kinship’, or ‘unemployment’ – is much 
harder.164 
 
Similar to the need to distinguish the external and internal narratives when 
examining images, the social researcher must distinguish the form of a visual 
image from its content. While the form and content are linked, they can be 
analyzed separately, and their relationship can be characterized. An 
important consideration is the extent to which the form of an image dictates 
or mediates the content.165 Also relevant is the extent – if any – to which the 
form or content is privileged over the other in a given social context.166 Their 
relationship may also suggest the potential representations of a visual 
image.167 
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Chapter Three – Northern Ireland 
 
3.0 Introduction 
 
To understand the context and chronology relevant to this case study, 
several major historical aspects of the conflict in Northern Ireland and the 
peace process merit review.168,169,170 A summary of the aims of various 
media covering the conflict within Northern Ireland follows. A chronology of 
major events in the conflict is compiled in the next chapter. 
 
3.1 Northern Ireland Conflict and The Peace Process 
 
Historical Perspectives 
 
Over the past century, Northern Ireland’s predominant confrontation has 
been the conflict over whether this state should remain part of the United 
Kingdom – as supported by Protestant Unionists – or become part of the 
Republic of Ireland as favoured by Catholic Nationalists.171 Before the 
twentieth century, Northern Ireland’s population had been comprised of two-
thirds Protestants and one-third Catholics. As outlined by McKittrick and 
McVea, this historical ratio shifted over the past century, in part as a result of 
political considerations, to approach one-to-one. Catholics now account for 
up to 45 per cent of the population. This increasing trend in the Catholic 
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population, although unlikely to lead to a majority in the near future, has 
already substantively altered the country’s political landscape in the setting of 
their “new Nationalist confidence”.172 
 
Opposition between these two corresponding factions – Unionist and 
Nationalist – had been deeply rooted well before Britain established Northern 
Ireland in 1921. The settlement implemented in the 1920s only exacerbated 
such tension and political instability. Unionists were ultimately “vilified for an 
unwillingness to share power” from which they had long benefitted, especially 
under the system established by Britain.173 
 
As the troubles emerged in the latter half of twentieth century, Britain’s lack 
of involvement and political miscalculations permitted aggression to intensify, 
including internment and Bloody Sunday.174 First, the two new states were 
granted considerable autonomy. However, Unionists alone benefitted from 
their immutable British relationship, which later garnered them substantive 
subsidies. In addition, they were permitted “to run Northern Ireland much as 
they chose”.175 Unionism further dominated as a result of its populous 
majority and political advantages.176 That the troubles were “a clash between 
two unreasonable warring tribes” – a historical British perspective177 – was 
largely a misconception.178,179 
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A lack of interest in civil rights, attributable in part to southern governments 
prioritizing a united Ireland, contributed also to this imbalance of power. After 
the 1920s, advancing civil rights interested mainly northern Nationalists, as 
this risked for others disrupting a “generally peaceful island”.180 
Institutionalized inequality also conferred to Protestants numerous systematic 
advantages. Catholics and Protestants were treated differently in politics, 
housing, employment, and most other areas affecting daily life.181 For 
decades, Catholics “believed they were treated as second-class citizens”.182 
 
The Early 1990s: A Volatile Peace Process 
 
By the 1990s, a modern ‘peace process’ had reshaped the politics of 
Northern Ireland and Anglo-Irish relations. This sluggish process was widely 
characterized as controversial, suspect, and circuitous.183 In early 1993, its 
pace accelerated with a volatile series of events that stimulated “excitement, 
controversy, much violence and on occasion near-despair”.184 Unveiled in 
December 1993, the Downing Street Declaration aimed to meld the concepts 
of self-determination and consent, without suggesting any British withdrawal: 
“The British government agree that it is for the people of the island of Ireland, 
by agreement between the two parts respectively, to exercise their right of 
self-determination on the basis of consent, freely and concurrently given, 
North and South, to bring about a united Ireland, if that is their wish”.185 
When the Irish Republican Army (IRA) announced a ceasefire the following 
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August, the Nationalist community responded initially with “jubilation”. While 
Nationalists and Unionists believed that the conflict had subsided, the 
cessation statement attracted some suspicion. Unionists were “more 
uncertain”, especially as the IRA had not announced that the ceasefire would 
be durable.186 Unionist politicians believed the announcement “a delusion 
and a trick”. Uncertainty regarding this new era grew also for Nationalists, 
with some questioning at first whether the Nationalist political party Sinn Fein 
“had reached some secret deal with the British government”.187 Discrepant 
views of this part of the peace process would hamper it for many years.  
 
Initially, however, “Reynolds [Taoiseach of Ireland] moved quickly to 
demonstrate his faith in Adams [Republican leader], meeting him and John 
Hume [leader of the Social Democratic and Labour Party] within a week of 
the ceasefire for a historic public handshake aimed at consolidating the 
cessation”.188 In October 1994, as the ceasefire continued, Loyalist 
paramilitary groups matched the position of the IRA: “they not only declared 
a ceasefire but set a new tone by including an unexpected note of apology, 
offering ‘the loved ones of all innocent victims over the past 25 years abject 
and true remorse’.”189 By supporting the peace process, previously violent 
Loyalists strengthened the process. Instead of posing an active threat as 
many had anticipated, Loyalist groups promoted moderation, dialogue, and a 
departure from the views of “mainstream Unionist politicians”.190 Daily life in 
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Northern Ireland improved, with “army patrols becoming less frequent and 
the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) visibly relaxing”.191 
 
In February 1995, British and Irish governments jointly published the seminal 
‘framework document’, drafted by Dublin diplomat Sean O’hUiginn and 
presenting their collective vision.192 They “envisaged Northern Ireland 
remaining part of the United Kingdom, stressing the importance of Unionist 
consent” but “stipulated that the Irishness of Nationalists should be formally 
expressed through progressively increased Dublin input, most tangibly 
through new cross-border institutions”.193 Unionist politicians rejected the 
document entirely. Nationalists were however receptive to the document, 
which provided the framework for subsequent negotiations. 
 
In May 1995, Sinn Fein representatives met British ministers to expand the 
process: “Fits Martin McGuiness met a junior minister in Belfast, then later 
that month Adams met Mayhew at a conference in Washington. By that 
stage Adams had already shaken hands with U.S. President Bill Clinton, 
South African President Nelson Mandela, British ministers and almost every 
major political figure in the Republic”.194 While British Prime Minister Major 
did not meet Sinn Fein, he met representatives of the parties linked to the 
Loyalist paramilitary groups. Loyalist parties remained active in the process 
and upheld the Loyalist cessation. 
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Previous uncertainties about the process were unfortunately prolonged by 
the absence of a formal political agreement. Fragility in the process became 
apparent by the middle of 1995: “the IRA ceasefire was showing signs of 
increasing strain, with Adams and other Sinn Fein figures repeatedly warning 
that the peace process was in crisis”.195 The Canary Wharf bombing in 1996 
demonstrated that “ceasefires could be broken as easily as they were 
called”.196 By 1996, regular acts of violence had recurred in Northern Ireland, 
with particularly brutal killings by Loyalists the following year.197 
 
The Breakthrough of 1997-2000 
 
The 1997 general election that led to Tony Blair replacing John Major, as well 
as concurrent council elections, “transformed the peace process”, which was 
associated also with Britain’s “social, economic and numerical growth”.198 
Further, over the ensuing decades, Nationalists leveraged a potential 
mechanism for nonviolence and negotiation through Sinn Fein, the 
establishment of an inclusive peace process, and The Good Friday 
Agreement.199 
 
Many were motivated to vote for the first time by the 1996 disturbances at 
Drumcree, the marching site of the Loyalist Orange Order.200 Marking a 
major shift in political representation, Nationalists won five of Northern 
Ireland’s eighteen seats in the Westminster parliament in the election, 
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including Martin McGuinness joining Gerry Adams as an MP.201 Ascendant 
Nationalist voting led to Unionists losing control of four councils, which 
included, for the first time in history, Belfast. Sinn Fein benefitted from this 
emergence of Nationalist voters, many of which were likely seeking a second 
ceasefire from the IRA.202 Despite clinging to an overall majority in Northern 
Ireland, the Unionist community had become more concentrated in regions 
around Belfast, where the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) and Sinn Fein 
predominated.203 The election of Blair afforded the Labour leader not only a 
large majority but also authority both inside and outside of parliament. To 
advance the peace process, Blair visited Belfast to re-establish direct contact 
between the government and Sinn Fein, and also installed Mo Mowlam, the 
first woman in the position of Northern Ireland Secretary, to positive effect.204 
 
Initial prospects for another ceasefire were unfortunately dampened by the 
IRA killing of two policemen in the County Armagh town of Lurgan, near 
Drumcree, merely weeks before Drumcree’s now annual marching 
confrontation. Many inferred that the IRA intended to confront Unionists 
rather than curtail its aggression. Persevering with the peace process, Blair 
and Mowlam invited Sinn Fein into negotiations without first requiring 
decommissioning of the IRA.205 In a “calculated gamble”, Blair and Mowlam 
announced the start of political talks in Northern Ireland for September 1997, 
permitting Sinn Fein’s participation after only a new IRA ceasefire.206 The 
government risked the Ulster Unionists departing these discussions if Sinn 
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Fein were admitted to them. Indeed, Paisley – a Loyalist politician and leader 
of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) – along with “other hardliners” had 
already signaled their intent to leave if Republicans were invited.207 
 
The British government’s gamble paid dividends. In July, the IRA restored its 
ceasefire despite the controversial decision by authorities, citing Loyalist 
threats to Nationalists, to lock down the Nationalists’ area and force the 
Drumcree march through the Nationalist stronghold of Garvaghy Road.208 
That Loyalist march led to extensive protests and violence. Crucially, after 
extensive consideration, David Trimble kept his Ulster Unionist Party in talks 
with Republicans.209,210 However, Paisley and his associates subsequently 
left the negotiations, the pace of which had become sluggish.211 Arriving at 
Stormont in the autumn of 1997, Blair endeavoured to revitalize the process 
in his meetings with leaders of the parties, including Sinn Fein.212 His 
handshake with Adams was the first between a British prime minister and a 
Republican leader since the 1920s.213 
 
However, by the end of 1997, the death toll of 21 persons was essentially 
unchanged from that of the previous year. Loyalists were now responsible for 
two-thirds of those 1997 deaths, whereas Republicans had killed roughly 
two-thirds in 1996. Although the majority of the Republican and Loyalist 
groups respected the summer ceasefire, minor paramilitary groups opposed 
the peace process and remained violent, particularly at the end of 1997. 
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Worsening violence and unprecedented movement in 1998 characterized 
“one of the most remarkable years of the troubles”. As Loyalist killings 
combined with Republican attacks, one newspaper reported: “People in 
Belfast now fall silent at television and radio news bulletins, waiting in dread 
to hear whether and where the gunmen have struck again, wondering how 
long the slaughter will go on at this appallingly metronomic rate. Hope 
remains alive for the peace process, but it takes a fresh pounding as news of 
each incident comes through”.214 The RUC claimed that both the IRA and 
Ulster Defense Association (UDA) had been involved in the killings. 
Consequently, the political representatives for these two groups – Sinn Fein 
and the Ulster Democratic Party, respectively – were temporarily excluded 
from the negotiations. 
 
Some conversations proceeded despite the disruption of this violence and 
these temporary expulsions. Unionists worked effectively with the Social 
Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) of Northern Ireland and the Irish 
government. However, Unionists and Sinn Fein were unable to trust each 
other, and thus did not formally meet or speak to each other during the 
negotiations or round-table talks. Tony Blair, Bertie Ahern, George Mitchell 
and the others “gathered for a tense and often fraught all-night session which 
eventually produced, on 10 April, what came to be known as the Good Friday 
Agreement”. This ambitious and historic agreement sought to revise the 
1920s settlement. Chief among its concepts were a “level playing field … on 
which Northern Ireland politics and Anglo-Irish relations would be conducted”, 
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the principles of power-sharing, and the Irish dimension – all familiar from the 
1973 Sunningdale Agreement. 
 
The Good Friday Agreement took however an unprecedented step with its 
closely interlocking system designed to incorporate all “political relationships 
within Northern Ireland, between north and south and between Britain and 
Ireland”.215 It addressed also “the Republican preoccupation with self-
determination but crucially … [required] that the people of Northern Ireland 
would decide whether it stayed with Britain or joined a united Ireland”. In 
rewriting Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish constitution, the accord removed “what 
Unionists regarded as the objectionable claim to the territory of Northern 
Ireland”. Moreover, 
 
It provided for a new 108-member Belfast assembly, to which 
Westminster would devolve full power over areas such as education, 
health and agriculture, including the right to make new laws. London 
would retain responsibility for matters such as defense and law and 
order, though it promised to consider devolving security powers at a 
later stage.216 
 
The projected government would consist of a Unionist First Minister and a 
Nationalist Deputy First Minister, who were required to agree on important 
decisions. A new constitutional framework would link the Assembly with 
London, Dublin, Scotland and Wales. A new British-Irish council would 
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include representatives of both governments and the “new devolved 
institutions” in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. Overall, Unionists and 
Nationalists were conferred equal “legitimacy and respect”.217 
Decommissioning of all paramilitary arms was also central to negotiations.218 
 
The Agreement was historic not only in its breadth but also its capacity to 
attract most major political stakeholders.219,220 While the Nationalist 
community was among its immediate supporters, the Ulster Unionist Party 
was much divided over the accord, which Paisley himself denounced. 
Despite the disapproval of some key members, Trimble achieved the support 
of his party, a major breakthrough given that a large proportion of Unionists 
was clearly opposed to negotiations with Nationalists. 
 
Referendums in the north and south on the approval of the Good Friday 
Agreement followed in May 1998. Nationalists favoured the Agreement 
overwhelmingly, but the Unionist community was evenly split, with equal 
proportions of Unionists voting ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ in the referendum. The final 
tally yielded an “overwhelming endorsement in the south and a 71 per cent 
Yes vote in the north … and amounted to a solid vote for the accord”.221 
However, that 71 per cent comprised virtually all Nationalist voters but only 
half of the Unionists, foreshadowing “another chapter in the familiar running 
battle between Unionist moderates and hardliners”. 
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Results of these referendums signaled a new era. This northern vote of 71 
per cent appeared to point to the emergence of a majority that favoured a 
new “deal”. One newspaper highlighted the potential of the Agreement: “It 
offers the chance to settle agreements by argument instead of by force. It is 
not perfect; it will not simply dissolve away the ancient problems; it will face 
many hurdles and still challenges. …”. Elections that June to the new 
Northern Ireland assembly yielded a “solid pro-agreement majority”. 
Heightened support for the SDLP and Sinn Fein222 contrasted again with a 
divided Ulster Unionist Party. Although the Unionist party captured the most 
seats, its share of the vote fell to its lowest levels in history, with Paisley and 
other anti-Agreement factions trailing Trimble by only 3 per cent.223 
 
Violence escalated in the summer of 1998 across Northern Ireland, 
beginning with the annual Orange Parade. Rather than hampering progress, 
these events galvanized politicians to advance the peace process.224 
Recalling its members from summer recess, both the British and Irish 
governments responded with legislation to implement stringent new security 
measures. Clinton and Blair visited Omagh, the site of a major bombing that 
August, “meeting around 700 of the injured and relatives of the dead and 
injured”. In September, Trimble agreed to meet directly with Adams for the 
first time in history. This development suggested a new working relationship, 
although one characterized “by neither friendship nor trust”.225 Conferring the 
Nobel peace prize jointly on Hume and Trimble in the autumn signaled 
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international aspiration for a durable peace settlement.226 By the end of 1998, 
“the leaders promoting peace in Northern Ireland were able to mobilize a 
broader level of elite consensus in support of their policies. The political 
environment was also calmer in Northern Ireland during this period”.227 
 
Whether this peace process will serve the traditional Nationalist goal of Irish 
unity or advance an entirely new objective remains unclear. Sinn Fein has 
promoted “the business of ‘hollowing out’ the Union”, while the Unionist 
David Trimble has argued that his “approach has strengthened the bonds 
with Britain”.228 Similarly unclear is whether The Good Friday Agreement will 
accomplish its long-term aim of alleviating violent conflict and contributing to 
political stability.229 While Nationalists recognize The Good Friday Agreement 
as a historic step toward inclusivity, it is “plainly not an inclusive settlement”, 
since roughly half of Unionists have opposed it.230 The general election in 
2001 revealed, for example, that Unionist anti-Agreement sentiment had 
grown, diminishing the strength of the Agreement.231 Similar doubt exists 
regarding a new governmental system.232 Nevertheless, recent perspectives 
suggest that a pathway to peace remains possible. Despite inevitable 
controversy, future initiatives may improve on decades of violence and 
turbulent conflict in Northern Ireland.233
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3.2 Orange Parades 
 
Drumcree and the Rise of David Trimble 
 
During the Loyalist marching season in July 1995, the RUC attempted to 
reroute away from a Nationalist district an Orange demonstration at 
Drumcree near Portadown in County Armagh, where thousands of 
Orangemen had congregated. The march was eventually allowed through 
this district, which was seen as a triumph for militant Loyalism.234 Indeed, 
“Paisley and the local Unionist MP, David Trimble, later celebrated the 
success by walking, hands joined aloft in triumph, through crowds of 
cheering supporters”.235 To commemorate its success in “pushing the 1995 
march through”, the Orange Order struck ‘Seige of Drumcree’ medals.236 For 
the rest of the 1990s, the Drumcree dispute erupted annually, “often leading 
to large-scale disturbances and violence”.237 
 
In a toughening of Unionist power, David Trimble defeated James Molyneaux 
that September for the leadership of the Ulster Unionist Party, after sixteen 
years. At the time, Trimble, a major supporter of the Orange Order at 
Drumcree, had been a Member of Parliament for only five years and was 
“regarded as the most hardline of the five candidates for the post”.238 His 
election indicated that Unionist party members had been pleased with 
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Trimble’s part in the 1995 triumph at Drumcree.239 Trimble’s emergence 
suggested also that the IRA ceasefire the previous year had failed to mollify 
Unionist attitudes: “The Protestant show of determination at Drumcree, 
together with Trimble’s election, showed that many Unionists viewed the 
peace process as a hazard rather than an opportunity”.240 
 
Drumcree 1996 
 
When the Drumcree parade returned in July 1996, apprehension about a 
major confrontation was heightened, with “the Protestant marchers … 
determined to get through” and “the Catholic residents … equally determined 
that they should not”.241 Academics Neil Jarman and Dominic Bryan 
summarized the dichotomy: “Each parade which is challenged is a symbolic 
threat to Protestant security and the Unionist position, while each parade 
which passes through a Nationalist area is a re-statement of the dominance 
of the Protestant community and the inferiority of Nationalist rights.”242 
 
RUC Chief Constable Sir Hugh Annesley again banned the parade from 
marching down the Nationalist Garvaghy Road. Orangemen attempting to do 
so were halted “by armoured Land Rovers, barbed wire, and RUC officers in 
full riot gear”. Undaunted, they remained stationed near the grounds of a 
Drumcree church, joined by thousands of supporters including Trimble. 
Loyalist protesters also “engaged in vitriolic abuse of the police”.243 
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In one of the most destabilising periods of the ‘troubles’, these conflicts 
engulfed much of Northern Ireland. Loyalists erected innumerable roadblocks 
and barricades, bringing daily life to a “standstill” and completely isolating 
several towns.244 Intimidation of police officers and their families was 
widespread. Burning and looting in some areas of Belfast, extensive 
destruction of property, and numerous injuries followed. Near Drumcree, 
Loyalists shot dead a Nationalist.245 The conflict 
 
came to a head on the morning of the Twelfth of July when it became 
evident that no negotiated settlement of the dispute was in sight. A 
number of Loyalists appeared with a bulldozer fitted with makeshift 
armour, threatening to drive it through the police lines. Tens of 
thousands of Orangemen were poised to march in processions all 
over Northern Ireland, and there were not enough RUC members and 
troops to police them all.246 
 
Given the risk of unmitigated disturbance across Northern Ireland, Annesley 
lifted his original ban, allowing the Orangemen along Garvaghy Road. As a 
consequence, Nationalist residents, many of whom had gathered in protest, 
had to be removed: “riot police cleared the road, with some rough-handling of 
residents captured in graphic detail by the television cameras”.247 Many 
Nationalists rioted; in Londonderry a man was killed. With the Orangemen 
completing their intended march, the “immediate threat of unrestrained civil 
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commotion” abated.248 The societal cost was however enormous. One 
commentator described it thusly: 
 
The underlying instability of the state was exposed, the very fabric of 
society ripped and damaged, and the most fundamental questions 
posed about the reform-ability of Northern Ireland. The episode left 
community relations in tatters and left a vast new reservoir of 
bitterness in its wake.249 
 
Despite the rancor between the two communities, its paramilitary groups 
refrained from “full-scale violence”. While minority subgroups on each side 
staged arson and other attacks, the mainstream groups avoided “uninhibited 
conflict”.250 
 
Drumcree 1998 
 
In July 1998, media attention shifted to renewed confrontation ahead of the 
Drumcree march. When authorities again prohibited the march down 
Garvaghy Road, Orangemen responded with disturbances – including 
roadblocks, protests, and rioting – throughout Northern Ireland.251 In a single 
twenty-four-hour period, records revealed “384 outbreaks of disorder, 115 
attacks on the security forces, 19 injuries to police, petrol bombs thrown on 
96 occasions, 403 petrol bombs seized, 57 homes and businesses damaged, 
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27 vehicles hijacked and another 89 damaged”.252 In a noteworthy tragedy 
from one of the petrol-bombing incidents, 
 
in the early hours of the Twelfth of July three small boys died in a fire 
caused by a Loyalist petrol bomb thrown into their house in the County 
Antrim town of Ballymoney. The Quinn children had a Catholic mother 
and a Protestant father. The protesters were chastened and the 
Drumcree disturbances quickly petered out. In the wake of the 
Ballymoney deaths, tensions ebbed away and a sense of 
confrontation was replaced by a lull.253 
 
Both the British and Irish governments implemented stringent new security 
measures in response. Unexpectedly, however, a bombing in Omagh 
followed that August. Republican dissidents activated a car bomb in a town in 
the County Tyrone town, killing twenty-nine people in “possibly the worst 
single incident of the troubles”.254 A group referencing itself as ‘the Real IRA’, 
comprised of former IRA members opposed to the peace process, had 
installed this bomb.255 Carrying an international impact, the shock of this 
attack was heightened by the prevailing view at the time that the violence 
had been declining. Omagh’s twenty-nine fatalities nearly doubled the death 
toll for 1998, a notable rise over the twenty-one lost in the previous year.256 
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Drumcree 2000 
 
In an inauspicious beginning to Drumcree’s summer of 2000, the Orange 
Order in Portadown “called on supporters to take to streets all over Northern 
Ireland. Days of disruption and roadblocks followed, bringing many districts 
to a standstill”.257 By the Twelfth of July, however, the Portadown 
Orangemen had overextended themselves. In the main, Unionist opinion did 
not support its disturbances, especially the refusal of Portadown Orange 
leader Harold Gracey to condemn violence.258 Unionists also distanced 
themselves from protests of the west Belfast UDA’s “particularly militant 
commander, Johnny ‘Mad Dog’ Adair”. As a consequence of these two 
developments, support for the disruptions receded, and, unlike in 1996 and 
1998, the “protests fizzled out”.259 
 
3.3 Northern Ireland Conflict and The Media 
 
As distinguished by O’Farrell, print and broadcast media covering events in 
Northern Ireland are either located in Northern Ireland or serve news 
organizations based outside Northern Ireland.260 These two groups may 
adhere to different standards of “fairness,” influenced by their audience and 
governmental restrictions. In Belfast, three daily newspapers – the News 
Letter, the Belfast Telegraph, and the Irish News – express different political 
perspectives of the conflict.261 The News Letter adopts a Unionist viewpoint, 
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“between the right wing of the Ulster Unionist Party and Ian Paisley’s 
Democratic Unionists”.262 In contrast, the Telegraph assumes a primarily 
liberal Unionist viewpoint but publishes opinions from across the political 
spectrum, from Unionist to Nationalist.263 The Irish News expresses a 
nonviolent Nationalist viewpoint, critical of IRA violence but assigning 
ultimate responsibility for “the woes of ‘The North’” to the Unionists and the 
British.264 Numerous local weekly newspapers also serve most towns in 
Northern Ireland, with at least two newspapers in each locale.265 Rather than 
educating or challenging the views of their readers, these weeklies reflect the 
ideologies, and prejudices, of their readership.266 
 
In their coverage of conflict within Northern Ireland, journalists are generally 
considered to align with one side.267 Even the place name selected by the 
journalist, such as the use of an internationally accepted name, identifies the 
reporter’s allegiance. As well, politicians in Northern Ireland seldom endorse 
“original thoughts” in publications.268 Media expression consequently reflects 
the ‘other’ – “left to barren sectarian clichés, where ‘our’ side is always the 
innocent victim of ‘their’ crimes”.269 
 
Journalists who report for media organizations that are based outside 
Northern Ireland adhere to a different set of rules and priorities.270 These 
reporters regard themselves as “uniquely impartial” – “outsiders” independent 
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from national media. While their reporting may be balanced, the editorial 
content of these outlets lacks such fairness.271 In this respect, 
 
With the exception of The Daily Mirror, whose ‘Troops Out’ line has 
been blunted over recent years, every London paper has always 
adopted a pro-Union stance. The Republic’s papers, with the 
exception of the Sunday Independent, take a ‘soft’ Nationalist 
line…which holds that Irish unity can only happen with Unionist 
consent … the editorial lines of papers in London and Dublin are at 
least subconsciously affected by the political moods around them.272 
 
Journalists grapple with major implications in determining the “fairness” of 
their reporting and whether to publish. Pessimistic viewpoints may 
overshadow the hope that a peace settlement can be achieved.273 Publishing 
some factual material might derail an historic agreement between 
enemies.274 Their most difficult question might be: “Is getting one’s byline on 
a front page one Sunday worth bodies on the streets?”275 Even reporters 
questioning the peace process or its stakeholders have been accused of 
favouring a state of war.276 Similarly, “questioning the pervasive and intrusive 
security state” that persists in Northern Ireland can draw assertions that one 
is “soft on terrorism”, and “distancing oneself from ‘terrorism’ is a popular 
field sport”.277 
 
                                                
271 Ibid, p.99 
272 Ibid, p.99 
273 Ibid, p.103 
274 Ibid, p.103 
275 Ibid, p.103 
276 Ibid, p.99 
277 Ibid, p.99 
 67 
In contrast, Fortnight, a small independent current affairs and arts magazine, 
was started in 1970 specifically in response to the ‘troubles’ and the 
sectarian division of Northern Ireland’s print media.278 Fortnight’s work 
reflects all political views to directly foster debate.279 Indeed, at various times, 
the periodical has been accused of being a tool of the IRA, the Ulster 
Volunteer Force, the Alliance Party, the SDLP, and British Intelligence.280 
Existing data suggest however that its readers and contributors are drawn 
mostly from a small leftist or liberal coterie, and that the publication’s 
operations are geographically limited.281 
 
British and Irish governments have both abnegated their responsibilities in 
media representation. They have promulgated “the fiction that they are 
honest brokers in a religious-based tribal conflict, a polite fiction whereby 
they depoliticize the situation”, avoided “blame for the political vacuum that 
encourages demagogues, and installed “themselves above the squabbling 
tribes”.282 This “two tribes” analysis has obscured the ongoing debate within, 
and between, the half-dozen Unionist parties and half-dozen Nationalist 
political factions.283 
 
From 1994 until 1998, statutory censorship banned Sinn Finn, the 
Progressive Unionists and Ulster Democrats from the airways.284 More 
recently, however, these parties have been included in traditional political 
debate on radio and television. Their inclusion has offset their image among 
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audiences as parties that “tended to demonize them as terrorist 
apologists”.285 Journalists could also not easily dismiss their views.286 Most 
political parties with parliamentary representation have tended to promote a 
culture of self-censorship. 
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Chapter Four – Case Study 
 
4.0 Introduction to the Case Study 
 
Concentrated in Northern Ireland, the Orange Order is a Protestant 
organization that emerged in the late eighteenth century to assert Protestant 
dominance during a period of conflict between sects of Protestants and 
Catholics.287 The Orange Order is aligned politically with Ulster Loyalism and 
conservative British Unionism. Its yearly parading season typically consists of 
marches between Easter Monday and mid-September, with the largest 
demonstration held on July 12th (‘The Twelfth’). Parades have been held in 
Northern Ireland since the eighteenth century.288 Formed shortly after the 
Orange Order, the Royal Black Institution is a separate society composed of 
selected members of the Orange Order and serves the principles of the 
Protestant Reformation.289 It holds a separate parade on July 13 that is 
usually regarded as less fractious than those of ‘The Twelfth’. The Apprentice 
Boys of Derry, formed in commemoration of their acts during the siege of 
Derry from James II, overlaps with but is not directly connected to the 
Orange Order.290 
 
The parades in Northern Ireland have been historically contentious for 
Nationalist and Unionist communities.291 The long parading season is 
comprised predominantly of Unionist parades, with Nationalist parades 
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emerging only during the ‘troubles’. Among the Unionists, the Orange Order 
– one of the most widespread and largest parading organizations – is 
responsible for the main parades on July 12th, a national holiday in Northern 
Ireland. Smaller regional parades also occur prior to this date. On the 
Second Saturday in June, the Portadown District Orangemen hold a Mini-
Twelfth Parade. On the Sunday before the 12th, Boyne anniversary church 
services are held at different venues across Northern Ireland, along with a 
preliminary parade to and from the church. On the 12th of July, nineteen main 
parades are held at different venues across Northern Ireland and mark both 
the highlight of the marching season and the end of the season for the 
Orange Institution. The number of annual parades in Northern Ireland 
increased markedly in the 1990s, with 1995 seeing a total of 3,500 parades – 
an increase of 43 per cent from a decade earlier.292 More than 80 percent of 
marches were Loyalist, with the remainder Nationalist.  
 
For the Unionist community, the most important parade on July 12th 
commemorates the Battle of the Boyne.293 For Unionists the parades 
represent their cultural tradition and history, but for the Nationalist community, 
the parades are a public demonstration of the Unionist community’s ongoing 
hegemony. Although Unionists do not observe their parades as primarily 
political, the Nationalist community sees them this way. Similarly, the 
Unionists see the Nationalist parades as political rather than cultural, a view 
which the Nationalists also dismiss.  
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While Nationalists may have attended the Unionist parades prior to the 
‘troubles’, or at least accepted them, such tolerance has diminished over the 
last few decades, with the parades becoming a contentious and often violent 
focus for confrontation between the two communities. Although the parades 
and the parading routes have been defended as ‘traditional’, the recent 
increase in the number of parades suggests that they are not all so. Several 
areas for parades and marches are controversial, with major flashpoints 
including the Bogside area of London/Derry and Ormeau Road in Belfast.  
 
The town of Portadown is a major area of violence surrounding the 
parades.294 During their parade to and from the Loyalists’ Drumcree church 
in Portadown, members of the Orange Order have often clashed with the 
predominantly Nationalist residents that reside along Garvaghy Road, which 
the Orange Order follows upon leaving Drumcree after church services. 
Although Garvaghy Road attracted international attention in 1995,295 the area 
had been a site of controversy since the parades were re-routed from the 
Nationalist Tunnel and Obins Street in 1986. Residents of Garvaghy Road in 
Portadown opposed this re-routing of the Orange March down their street 
and formed the Garvaghy Road Residents’ Association (GRRA) to ensure 
that any Orange parades that intended to march along this road met their 
approval. 
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Violent rioting was commonplace during parading seasons from 1995 to 
1999.296 The 1995 parades at Drumcree, which occurred shortly after the 
1994 ceasefire, brought the issue of the parades to the forefront of the 
conflict and continued to do so until 2000. In 1995, the Royal Ulster 
Constabulary (RUC) prevented the Orange Order from marching along 
Garvaghy Road after a service that fell on the Sunday before the 12th. A two-
day standoff ensued between the RUC and the Orangemen. The event 
precipitated annual standoffs and protests between Unionists and 
Nationalists, which led to violence and increased policing throughout 
Northern Ireland. Violence through military organizations and weapons was 
chosen to express political discontent and mobilize political demands. 
Disputes over the Drumcree parade revealed also problems with the rule of 
law in Northern Ireland and the impartiality of the police force. 
 
Major events involving the parades, which occurred annually in Portadown 
from 1994 until 2003, are summarized in Table 1. Analysis of photographic 
media coverage of the parades and the underlying conflict was carried out 
before, at, and following the peak of the conflict violence in the 1998 parade. 
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Table 1. Summary of Political Events in the Northern 
Ireland Peace Process and Relation to Drumcree 
Parades (1994–2005) 
 
 
Year Developments in 
Political Process 
Drumcree 
Developments 
Results 
 
 
1994 19th January – broadcasting 
ban was lifted allowing SF to 
access the Irish media 
August 31st – Full IRA 
ceasefire called 
October 13th – Full Loyalist 
Ceasefire 
 
  
1995 May 10th  – First official 
meeting between the SF & 
the British Government at 
Stormont in 23 years 
 
July 27th - Gerry Adams (SF) 
meets with the NI Secretary 
of State Patrick Mayhew for 
official talks at Stormont 
Drumcree I 
 
 
July 9th - RUC blocked 
Orange Parade down 
Garvaghy Road; led to 
stand-off, road blocks and 
protests by Loyalists across 
Northern Ireland 
 David Trimble takes part in 
the Drumcree stand-off 
 
July 11th – compromise 
reached allowing the 
parade to march down 
Garvaghy Road  
 
September 8th – David 
Trimble elected leader 
of the Ulster Unionist 
Party (UUP) in part 
because of his 
involvement in 
Drumcree 
 
[Some suggestion that 
the parades became 
an outlet for political 
expression and 
traditional cultural 
grievances due to 
ceasefire and the 
inability to forge 
paramilitary violence] 
 
1996 February 9th – End of the 
IRA ceasefire after the IRA 
detonate a bomb in Canary 
Wharf, London 
 
British & Irish leaders 
announce date of June 10th 
for all-party talks 
 
April 28th – IRA must restore 
ceasefire before SF can join 
all-party talks 
Drumcree II 
 
 
July 7th – RUC prevents 
Portadown Orange march 
from going down Garvaghy 
Road starting protests and 
roadblocks all over NI 
 
This parade led to 
even more widespread 
rioting throughout 
Northern Ireland with 
over 10 000 Loyalist 
protesters and policing 
costs rising to a record 
200 million  
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June 10th – All-party 
negotiations begin at 
Stormont excluding SF 
 
June 15th – IRA exploded 
bomb in Manchester injuring 
200 people 
 
July 13th – IRA bomb in 
Enniskillen 
 
October 7th – IRA bombs the 
British Army Headquarters in 
County Antrim 
 
1997  
January 29th – Call for an 
Independent Parades 
Commission to be set up 
 
February 12th – IRA shot 
dead a British soldier at a 
check point in County 
Armagh 
 
May 1st – Labour Party and 
Tony Blair elected with Mo 
Mowlam appointed Secretary 
of State for Northern Ireland 
 
May 16th – Tony Blair agrees 
to exploratory talks between 
government and SF 
 
June 16th – IRA shoot two 
RUC officers in County 
Armagh; Tony Blair bans 
further talk between 
government and SF 
 
July 20th – Gerry Adams (SF) 
gets IRA to declare a 
renewal of the ceasefire 
 
August 26th – the 
Independent International 
Commission on 
Decommissioning (IICD) was 
established to oversee 
paramilitary 
decommissioning 
 
August 29th – Mo Mowlam 
announces that SF can join 
Drumcree III 
 
 
July 6th – violence in 
Portadown which spread to 
other Nationalist areas after 
the RUC sealed off the 
Garvaghy Road to allow the 
Orange march to proceed 
 
 
 
 75 
all-party talks 
 
September 9th – SF enters 
the multi-party talks at 
Stormont; DUP boycotts the 
talks 
 
October 13th – Tony Blair 
meets Gerry Adams & Martin 
McGuiness for the first time 
 
1998 March 26th – independent 
chairman of the multi-party 
talks, sets April 9th deadline 
for the talks  
 
April 10th – Good Friday 
Agreement is signed by all 
the parties and talks are 
brought to an end 
 
May 22nd – referendums on 
the Agreement in Northern 
Ireland and the Republic 
lead to its endorsement 
Drumcree IV 
 
First year that the Parades 
Commission is set up to 
make decisions 
 
No local decision between 
communities 
 
Sunday July 5th parade was 
re-routed 
 
Orange Order (OO) 
announces that it will march 
‘traditional’ route and ignore 
decision and stand ground it 
confronted for as long as 
necessary 
 
From July 3rd to 4th 1000 
British troops and 1000 
RUC officers were deployed 
in Drumcree; a barricade 
was erected and a trench 
laid with barbed wire was 
built between Drumcree 
Church and Garvaghy Road 
 
On Sunday the 5th OO 
marched to barricade then 
returned to church for a 
‘stand-off’  
 
 
Rioting in number of 
Unionist areas of 
Northern Ireland and 
blocked roads 
throughout 
 
OO decides to 
continue token 
demonstration and 
stand-off until allowed 
to march down 
Garvaghy Road which 
continued until July 
1999 
 
No resolution found 
 
Widespread violence 
across Northern 
Ireland 
 
Between July 4th and 
July 14th 1998: 
 
2561 public order 
incidents; 144 houses 
damaged; 76 police 
officers injured 
632 petrol bombs 
thrown; 2250 petrol 
bombs recovered 
 
Nationalist homes 
attacked by petrol 
bombs 
 
Large numbers of 
illegal parades 
 
Violence intensified 
over the 12th weekend 
with Paisley saying it 
would be “settling day” 
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Sunday July 12th 1998, 
Nationalist Quinn 
family home petrol-
bombed and three 
young boys are killed 
 
RUC begins search 
operation at Drumcree 
and recovers mass of 
weapons 
 
OO numbers have 
decreased 
considerably 
  
 
1999 December 2nd – Unionists 
enter into an executive with 
SF and devolution of powers 
from Westminster to 
Stormont 
Drumcree V 
 
In the absence of local 
agreement on the parades, 
the Parades Commission 
ruled that the parade would 
be re-routed; 
 
The protests from Drumcree 
1998 continued until July 
1999 and throughout there 
were scores of marches 
and parades in Portadown 
and the rest of Northern 
Ireland for the OO 
 
RUC erected a fifteen ft 
steel barricade, razor 
barbed wire and a moat 
between the police and the 
protesters; 1300 
Orangemen marched and 
met up with several 
thousand supporters at 
Drumcree; 
 
After church, six members 
marched to the police 
barricade and delivered a 
letter to the RUC in protest 
and then retreated to a rally 
 
The rally was addressed by 
Harold Gracey (District O 
Master) who asked for 
peaceful protest 
 
 
High level of 
intimidation and 
attacks on Nationalist 
families in the region 
 
July 4th Parade was 
relatively peaceful with 
only a few violent 
episodes in Portadown 
and Ballymena 
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2000 February 11th – Suspension 
of Stormont executive and 
reinstatement of ‘direct rule’ 
from Westminster because 
of a lack of progress on IRA 
decommissioning 
 
May 29th – Institutions and 
Executive were reinstated 
 
The ‘traditional date’ for the 
Drumcree parade was July 
9th, but an additional parade 
was added on July 2nd, 
perhaps to heighten tension 
for the Twelfth; parades 
commission rules that it 
would be re-routed from 
Drumcree 
 
July 9th Drumcree parade 
was also re-routed from the 
Garvaghy Road 
 
Violent protests in 
Portadown and 
Drumcree following the 
July 2nd parade; roads 
were blocked in towns 
across Northern 
Ireland 
2001 August 10th & September 
21st – short tactical 
suspensions of Stormont for 
24-hour periods 
 
October 23rd – IRA entered 
into discussions with the 
Independent International 
Commission on 
Decommissioning (IICD) 
 
  
2002 October 14th – Indefinite 
period of suspension of 
Stormont begins 
 
  
2003 No major events 
 
  
2004 No major events 
 
  
2005 September 26th – IICD 
reports that the IRA had 
decommissioned all its 
weapons. Unionists still 
refuse to enter into a power-
sharing Executive and at the 
beginning of 2006 the 
devolved institutions remain 
suspended 
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4.1 Hypothesis 
 
Across the period of 1996 to 2000, the content of newspaper images 
from democratic countries regarding the annual July 12th Drumcree 
parades in Portadown, Northern Ireland does not vary according to 
level of violence in the Northern Ireland conflict and lacks depictions of 
peace-building and the peaceful resolution of conflict. Central to this 
hypothesis is the study ‘main unit’: During parades associated with national 
violence in Northern Ireland, as compared to periods of relative peace, what 
are the dominant images issued by major newspapers depicting the ‘other’ 
and representing the conflict? 
 
4.2 Methodology, Source Selection, and Data Collection 
 
This case study evaluates the content of the images published in major 
newsprint media to capture the events of the July 12th parades in Portadown, 
Northern Ireland and the subsequent church services, in July 1996, July 
1998, and July 2000 – the ‘sample unit’ of this study. To examine potential 
relationships between sampled photographic content and differing events in 
the conflict and peace process in Northern Ireland – including differences in 
acts of violence and aggression – the study selected images from the years 
1996, 1998, and 2000 for analysis. Assessment of content follows 
recognized methods for quantitative visual analysis that are outlined in The 
SAGE Handbook of Visual Research Methods.297 
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This paper posits that Northern Ireland, the Republic of Ireland and Britain 
are partners in the conflict and in the peace process. Accordingly, print 
newspapers from each of these countries are reviewed. In addition, the 
range of newspapers examined will differ in political perspective (i.e., left, 
central and right) and type of publication (tabloid or broadsheet). In the case 
of the newspapers surveyed in Northern Ireland, local circulation papers and 
two defined partisan papers (Nationalist and Unionist) were considered. The 
major reasons for including diverse sources are, first, to examine how the 
conflict is covered using news photographs by a broad cross-section of the 
press and, second, to examine if differences exist in the selection or use of 
these photographs across these news organizations. Newspapers were 
restricted to English-language printed publications; content from online 
sources, if available, did not add significantly to available material during the 
study period. After screening candidate newspapers, the following print 
newspapers were included for analysis of photographic material: 
 
• Northern Ireland: (1) The Irish News; (2) The Belfast Telegraph; (3) 
The Portadown Times 
 
• Republic of Ireland: (4) The Irish Times; (5) The Irish Independent 
 
• Britain (outside Northern Ireland): (6) The Times 
 
Newspapers were selected according to their varying geographic and 
ideological features, with sources from each of Northern Ireland, the Republic 
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of Ireland, and Britain. Newspapers were analyzed during the following 
periods: July 1 to 31, 1996; July 1 to 31, 1998; and July 1 to 31, 2000. 
 
Photographs included in the study were restricted to images that related 
directly to the Portadown parades or Drumcree and that related only to the 
‘Twelfth’ proceedings. Images from parades at other locations or specific to 
other normal parade dates, services, or towns were excluded. Reprinted 
photographs, retrospective or summative coverage photos, or photos 
surveying the news coverage from other newspapers were also not retrieved. 
The format was any of original print, electronic storage (e.g., scanned 
images), or microfilm. 
 
Each newspaper was reviewed systematically for images related to or 
accompanied by written material on Portadown or Drumcree. Images were 
characterized based on their primary content, assigning one dominant theme 
to the content of each image. Each image was categorized into one of the 
following dominant or salient themes: Direct Confrontation; 
Police/Authority/Barriers; Visible Violence/Results of Violent Acts; Pictures of  
‘Victims’; Mass of Protesters; Marching; Portraits of Major Players; 
Signs/Symbols/Maps Related to Conflict; Comic Illustration of Conflict; and 
Peacemaking/Portraits Depicting Peace. These themes were selected and 
defined to allow for subsequent grouping into subject matter that was 
regarded as either predominantly violent or aggressive, neutral, or peaceful, 
with the latter consistent with Galtung’s definition.298  
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Dominant theme was coded according to pre-defined characteristics that 
could be identified from any news image, while minimizing overlap between 
such characteristics. ‘Direct confrontation’ depicts opposing groups in a 
confrontation during a parade, march, or protest that raises the potential for 
violence or aggression, with at least two groups represented predominantly 
by their members and/or an opposing physical barrier that manifestly 
impedes one group (e.g., one group impeded from forward progress by lines 
of police). ‘Police / Authority / Barriers’ is a deterrent and single-group 
portrayal of police or policing, officers, or authority figures on either side of 
the conflict, depictions of physical barriers to demonstrations (e.g., 
barricades), or potential threats of physical conflict or implied aggression. 
Violent or aggressive material comprises direct or imminent physical contact, 
arms or use of arms, rioting, consequences of violence (e.g., damage to 
property, loss of life), or direct risk to safety or well being of any persons (e.g., 
burning a church). ‘Victims’ refers to a portrayal of one or more persons who 
have been previously adversely affected by the conflict or violence. ‘Mass of 
Protesters’ is characterized by an assembly of protesters without an 
equivalent depiction of an opposing group in the scene. ‘Marching’ is an 
image depicting movement of one or more persons participating directly in 
the marching aspect of the parade or a related procession, or the supporters 
of those marching. ‘Major players’ refers to a portrait or non-aggressive 
depiction of leaders, stakeholders or key figures in the Northern Ireland 
conflict. ‘Signs/symbols’ is any inanimate representation of the conflict, such 
as a mural, poster, protest signage, or logo, which does not contain or reflect 
an unambiguously peaceful message. 
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‘Peacemaking/Portraits Depicting Peace’ refers to all forms of imagery that 
illustrate or reflect conciliation, mediation, dialogue to foster conflict 
resolution or the peace process, expression or promotion of peace-building, 
consensus-building, fostering pro-social or friendly relationships, portraits of 
peacemakers or peaceful themes, non-photographic images or drawings with 
peaceful messages, or serving as a peaceful witness. It includes also 
portraits of persons not associated with aggressive roles who are 
undertaking activities of daily life (e.g., pastor preparing for a service, 
residents distributing food supplies). 
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4.3 Data Analysis 
 
To distinguish their content for analysis, images were assigned 
systematically to one of the following three thematic domains: (1) Acts of 
Physical Violence/Aggression; (2) Non-Violent and Non-Peaceful Actions; 
and (3) Peacemaking/Peaceful Actions. The Violence/Aggression domain 
encompasses the following image themes: Direct Confrontation; Police / 
Authority / Barriers; Visible Violence/Results of Violent Acts; and Pictures of 
‘Victims’.  The Non-Violent/Non-Peaceful domain, which captured non-violent 
actions that were also not intended to promote peaceful relations, includes 
these themes: Mass of Protesters; Marching; Portraits of Major Players; 
Signs/Symbols/Maps Related to Conflict; and Comic Illustration. 
Peacemaking/Peaceful Actions encompasses the final theme of 
Peacemaking/Portraits Depicting Peace. 
 
The absolute and relative frequencies of these three content groups were 
then tabulated, and compared across the three years of study and 
publications. In assessing trends of content, study periods in 1996 and 1998 
were taken as violent periods, while the 2000 period was regarded as 
relatively peaceful. Based on the previously reviewed literature and 
previously tabulated events, 1998 including July 1998 was considered to be 
more objectively violent than 1996 including July 1996. 
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Chapter Five – Results and Findings 
 
5.1 Results from Case Study 
 
The volume of selected images (total, 284) was equal in 1996 (114 images) 
and 1998 (114 images), diminishing in the more peaceful year of 2000 (56 
images). Led by The Irish News and The Portadown Times, newspapers in 
Northern Ireland published more photographs (214) than all other papers 
(Table 2 – Appendix and Table 3). Images characterized as 
violent/aggressive (V/A) or non-violent/non-peaceful (NV/NP) predominated 
in all years of the study in all publications. 
 
In the Northern Ireland newspapers, the proportion of V/A material was 
higher in 1996 than in 1998, while the opposite was apparent in the Irish and 
British publications (Table 4). No overall difference in the publication rate of 
V/A material was evident consistently between 1996 and 1998. Decreases in 
V/A material in the Northern Ireland publications from 1996 to 1998 were 
associated with commensurate increases in their NV/NP content. In most 
newspapers, the proportions of both V/A (Table 4) and NV/NP content (Table 
5) were higher in the relatively peaceful period of 2000 than their proportions 
in at least one of the other ‘violent’ years of 1996 and 1998. No overall trend 
was observed in relation to the level of violence across 1996 to 2000. 
 
Portrayal of any peacemaking or peaceful (P/P) content in newspaper 
images was extremely limited (Table 6). Such content did not vary over time 
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or according to the level of violence. In four of the six newspapers – one of 
the Northern Ireland newspapers, both Irish papers, and The Times – no 
such images appeared in any years. In the remaining two Northern Ireland 
publications, the proportion of P/P content was somewhat higher in 1998 
than in 1996, and such material was virtually absent in 2000. The largest 
proportion achieved at any point, by the Portadown Times in 1998, was 17%. 
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Table 3. Summary of Type of Content of Newspaper 
Images for July Portadown parades in 1996, 1998, 
and 2000 
 
Northern Ireland 
 
1. The Irish News 
 
Year Type of Image Number (Count) 
 
1996 Direct Confrontation 4 
1996 Police/Authority/Barriers 2 
1996 Visible Violence/Results 4 
1996 Pictures of  ‘Victims’ 1 
1996 Mass of Protesters 1 
1996 Marching 3 
1996 Portraits of Major Players 5 
1996 Comic 1 
1996 Signs/Symbols/Maps 1 
1996 Peacemaking/Portraits 3 
Total – July 1996  
  
  
  
25 
 
Violence/Aggression: 11/25 (44%) 
Non-Violent/Non-Peaceful: 11/25 (44%) 
Peacemaking/Peaceful: 3/25 (12%) 
   
1998 Direct Confrontation 4 
1998 Police/Authority/Barriers 0 
1998 Visible Violence/Results 0 
1998 Pictures of ‘Victims’ 2 
1998 Mass/Protesters 1 
1998 Marching 0 
1998 Portraits of Major Players 4 
1998 Comic 1 
1998 Signs/Symbols/Maps 7 
1998 Peacemaking/Portraits 3 
Total – July 1998  
  
  
  
22 
 
Violence/Aggression: 6/22 (27%) 
Non-Violent/Non-Peaceful: 13/22 (59%) 
Peacemaking/Peaceful: 3/22 (14%) 
   
2000 Direct Confrontation 1 
2000 Police/Authority/Barriers 2 
2000 Visible Violence/Results 1 
2000 Pictures of ‘Victims’ 0 
2000 Mass/Protesters 2 
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2000 Marching 0 
2000 Portraits of Major Players 4 
2000 Comic 2 
2000 Signs/Symbols/Maps 0 
2000 Peacemaking/Portraits 0 
Total – July 2000  
  
  
  
12 
 
Violence/Aggression: 4/12 (33%) 
Non-Violent/Non-Peaceful: 8/12 (67%) 
Peacemaking/Peaceful: 0/12 (0%) 
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2. The Belfast Telegraph 
 
Year Type of Image Number 
 
1996 Direct Confrontation 4 
1996 Police/Authority/Barriers 2 
1996 Visible Violence/Results 3 
1996 Pictures of  ‘Victims’ 0 
1996 Mass/Protesters 2 
1996 Marching 4 
1996 Portraits of Major Players 1 
1996 Comic 0 
1996 Signs/Symbols/Maps 0 
1996 Peacemaking/Portraits 0 
Total – July 1996  
  
  
  
16 
 
Violence/Aggression: 9/16 (56%) 
Non-Violent/Non-Peaceful: 7/16 (44%) 
Peacemaking/Peaceful: 0/16 (0%) 
 
   
1998 Direct Confrontation 0 
1998 Police/Authority/Barriers 1 
1998 Visible Violence/Results 0 
1998 Pictures of ‘Victims’ 0 
1998 Mass/Protesters 3 
1998 Marching 0 
1998 Portraits of Major Players 1 
1998 Comic 0 
1998 Signs/Symbols/Maps 1 
1998 Peacemaking/Portraits 0 
Total – July 1998  
  
  
  
6 
 
Violence/Aggression: 1/6 (17%) 
Non-Violent/Non-Peaceful: 5/6 (83%) 
Peacemaking/Peaceful: 0/6 (0%) 
 
   
2000 Direct Confrontation 2 
2000 Police/Authority/Barriers 1 
2000 Visible Violence/Results 0 
2000 Pictures of ‘Victims’ 0 
2000 Mass/Protesters 2 
2000 Marching 0 
2000 Portraits of Major Players 2 
2000 Comic 0 
2000 Signs/Symbols/Maps 0 
2000 Peacemaking/Portraits 0 
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Total – July 2000  
  
  
  
7 
 
Violence/Aggression: 3/7 (43%) 
Non-Violent/Non-Peaceful: 4/7 (57%) 
Peacemaking/Peaceful: 0/7 (0%) 
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3. The Portadown Times 
 
Year Type of Image Number 
 
1996 Direct Confrontation 4 
1996 Police/Authority/Barriers 3 
1996 Visible Violence/Results 9 
1996 Pictures of  ‘Victims’ 4 
1996 Mass/Protesters 2 
1996 Marching 7 
1996 Portraits of Major Players 5 
1996 Comic 0 
1996 Signs/Symbols/Maps 1 
1996 Peacemaking/Portraits 3 
Total – July 1996  
  
  
  
38 
 
Violence/Aggression: 20/38 (53%) 
Non-Violent/Non-Peaceful: 15/38 (39%) 
Peacemaking/Peaceful: 3/38 (8%) 
 
   
1998 Direct Confrontation 2 
1998 Police/Authority/Barriers 16 
1998 Visible Violence/Results 5 
1998 Pictures of ‘Victims’ 0 
1998 Mass/Protesters 4 
1998 Marching 6 
1998 Portraits of Major Players 17 
1998 Comic 0 
1998 Signs/Symbols/Maps 4 
1998 Peacemaking/Portraits 11 
Total – July 1998  
  
  
  
65 
 
Violence/Aggression: 23/65 (35%) 
Non-Violent/Non-Peaceful: 31/65 (48%) 
Peacemaking/Peaceful: 11/65 (17%) 
 
   
2000 Direct Confrontation 0 
2000 Police/Authority/Barriers 4 
2000 Visible Violence/Results 3 
2000 Pictures of ‘Victims’ 0 
2000 Mass/Protesters 2 
2000 Marching 2 
2000 Portraits of Major Players 7 
2000 Comic 0 
2000 Signs/Symbols/Maps 4 
2000 Peacemaking/Portraits 1 
 91 
Total – July 2000  
  
  
  
23 
 
Violence/Aggression: 7/23 (31%) 
Non-Violent/Non-Peaceful: 15/23 (65%) 
Peacemaking/Peaceful: 1/23 (4%) 
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Republic of Ireland 
 
4. The Irish Times 
 
Year Type of Image Number 
 
1996 Direct Confrontation 2 
1996 Police/Authority/Barriers 0 
1996 Visible Violence/Results 3 
1996 Pictures of  ‘Victims’ 0 
1996 Mass/Protesters 2 
1996 Marching 1 
1996 Portraits of Major Players 5 
1996 Comic 1 
1996 Signs/Symbols/Maps 3 
1996 Peacemaking/Portraits 0 
Total – July 1996  
  
  
  
17 
 
Violence/Aggression: 5/17 (29%) 
Non-Violent/Non-Peaceful: 12/17 (71%) 
Peacemaking/Peaceful: 0/17 (0%) 
   
1998 Direct Confrontation 2 
1998 Police/Authority/Barriers 0 
1998 Visible Violence/Results 3 
1998 Pictures of ‘Victims’ 0 
1998 Mass/Protesters 0 
1998 Marching 0 
1998 Portraits of Major Players 1 
1998 Comic 0 
1998 Signs/Symbols/Maps 1 
1998 Peacemaking/Portraits 0 
Total – July 1998  
  
  
  
7 
 
Violence/Aggression: 5/7 (71%) 
Non-Violent/Non-Peaceful: 2/7 (29%) 
Peacemaking/Peaceful: 0/7 (0%) 
   
2000 Direct Confrontation 0 
2000 Police/Authority/Barriers 2 
2000 Visible Violence/Results 2 
2000 Pictures of ‘Victims’ 0 
2000 Mass/Protesters 0 
2000 Marching 0 
2000 Portraits of Major Players 2 
2000 Comic 0 
2000 Signs/Symbols/Maps 1 
2000 Peacemaking/Portraits 0 
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Total – July 2000  
  
  
  
7 
 
Violence/Aggression: 4/7 (57%) 
Non-Violent/Non-Peaceful: 3/7 (43%) 
Peacemaking/Peaceful: 0/7 (0%) 
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5. The Irish Independent 
 
Year Type of Image Number 
 
1996 Direct Confrontation 3 
1996 Police/Authority/Barriers 0 
1996 Visible Violence/Results 4 
1996 Pictures of  ‘Victims’ 0 
1996 Mass/Protesters 0 
1996 Marching 2 
1996 Portraits of Major Players 5 
1996 Comic 0 
1996 Signs/Symbols/Maps 0 
1996 Peacemaking/Portraits 0 
Total – July 1996  
  
  
  
14 
 
Violence/Aggression: 7/14 (50%) 
Non-Violent/Non-Peaceful: 7/14 (50%) 
Peacemaking/Peaceful: 0/14 (0%) 
 
   
1998 Direct Confrontation 2 
1998 Police/Authority/Barriers 3 
1998 Visible Violence/Results 1 
1998 Pictures of ‘Victims’ 0 
1998 Mass/Protesters 0 
1998 Marching 0 
1998 Portraits of Major Players 1 
1998 Comic 0 
1998 Signs/Symbols/Maps 0 
1998 Peacemaking/Portraits 0 
Total – July 1998  
  
  
  
7 
 
Violence/Aggression: 6/7 (86%) 
Non-Violent/Non-Peaceful: 1/7 (14%) 
Peacemaking/Peaceful: 0/7 (0%) 
 
   
2000 Direct Confrontation 1 
2000 Police/Authority/Barriers 2 
2000 Visible Violence/Results 0 
2000 Pictures of ‘Victims’ 0 
2000 Mass/Protesters 0 
2000 Marching 0 
2000 Portraits of Major Players 1 
2000 Comic 0 
2000 Signs/Symbols/Maps 0 
2000 Peacemaking/Portraits 0 
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Total – July 2000  
  
  
  
4 
 
Violence/Aggression: 3/4 (75%) 
Non-Violent/Non-Peaceful: 1/4 (25%) 
Peacemaking/Peaceful: 0/4 (0%) 
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Britain (outside Northern Ireland) 
 
6. The Times 
 
Year Type of Image Number 
(Count) 
1996 Direct Confrontation 1 
1996 Police/Authority/Barriers 0 
1996 Visible Violence/Results 2 
1996 Pictures of  ‘Victims’ 0 
1996 Mass/Protesters 0 
1996 Marching 0 
1996 Portraits of Major Players 1 
1996 Comic 0 
1996 Signs/Symbols/Maps 0 
1996 Peacemaking/Portraits 0 
Total – July 1996  
  
  
  
4 
 
Violence/Aggression: 3/4 (75%) 
Non-Violent/Non-Peaceful: 1/4 (25%) 
Peacemaking/Peaceful: 0/4 (0%) 
   
1998 Direct Confrontation 0 
1998 Police/Authority/Barriers 3 
1998 Visible Violence/Results 1 
1998 Pictures of ‘Victims’ 1 
1998 Mass/Protesters 0 
1998 Marching 0 
1998 Portraits of Major Players 1 
1998 Comic 0 
1998 Signs/Symbols/Maps 1 
1998 Peacemaking/Portraits 0 
Total – July 1998  
  
  
  
7 
 
Violence/Aggression: 5/7 (71%) 
Non-Violent/Non-Peaceful: 2/7 (29%) 
Peacemaking/Peaceful: 0/7 (0%) 
   
2000 Direct Confrontation 0 
2000 Police/Authority/Barriers 0 
2000 Visible Violence/Results 0 
2000 Pictures of ‘Victims’ 0 
2000 Mass/Protesters 0 
2000 Marching 0 
2000 Portraits of Major Players 2 
2000 Comic 1 
2000 Signs/Symbols/Maps 0 
2000 Peacemaking/Portraits 0 
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Total – July 2000  
  
  
  
3 
 
Violence/Aggression: 0/3 (0%) 
Non-Violent/Non-Peaceful: 3/3 
(100%) 
Peacemaking/Peaceful: 0/3 (0%) 
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Table 4. Proportion of Images of Violence / Aggression 
 
 
Publication 
 
1996 1998 2000 
The Irish News 
 
11/25 (44%) 6/22 (27%) 4/12 (33%) 
The Belfast 
Telegraph 
 
9/16 (56%) 1/6 (17%) 3/7 (43%) 
The Portadown 
Times 
 
20/38 (53%) 23/65 (35%) 
 
7/23 (31%) 
The Irish Times 5/17 (29%) 
 
5/7 (71%) 
 
4/7 (57%) 
The Irish 
Independent 
 
7/14 (50%) 6/7 (86%) 3/4 (75%) 
The Times (Brit) 
 
3/4 (75%) 5/7 (71%) 0/3 (0%) 
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Table 5. Proportion of Images with Non-Violent / Non-Peaceful 
Content 
 
 
Publication 
 
1996 1998 2000 
The Irish News 
 
11/25 (44%) 13/22 (59%) 8/12 (67%) 
The Belfast 
Telegraph 
 
7/16 (44%) 5/6 (83%) 4/7 (57%) 
The Portadown 
Times 
 
15/38 (39%) 31/65 (48%) 15/23 (65%) 
The Irish Times 
 
12/17 (71%) 2/7 (29%) 3/7 (43%) 
The Irish 
Independent 
 
7/14 (50%) 1/7 (14%) 1/4 (25%) 
The Times (Brit) 
 
1/4 (25%) 2/7 (29%) 3/3 (100%) 
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Table 6. Proportion of Images with Peacemaking / Peaceful 
Content 
 
 
Publication 
 
1996 1998 2000 
The Irish News 
 
3/25 (12%) 3/22 (14%) 0/12 (0%) 
The Belfast 
Telegraph 
 
0/16 (0%) 0/6 (0%) 0/7 (0%) 
The Portadown 
Times 
 
3/38 (8%) 11/65 (17%) 1/23 (4%) 
The Irish Times 
 
0/17 (0%) 0/7 (0%) 0/7 (0%) 
The Irish 
Independent 
 
0/14 (0%) 0/7 (0%) 0/4 (0%) 
The Times (Brit) 
 
0/4 (0%) 0/7 (0%) 0/3 (0%) 
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5.2 Findings and Importance 
 
During the violent periods in Northern Ireland of 1996 and 1998, newspapers 
published an overall large volume and a dominant proportion of images 
depicting physical violence, aggression, threatened aggression, and non-
peaceful responses to conflict. In contrast, during the relatively peaceful 
demonstrations of the summer of 2000, no newspapers published any 
images with peaceful content. In 1996 and 1998, only two newspapers 
published any images depicting peaceful themes, in low proportions and low 
overall volume compared to their other content in those years.  
 
From 1996/1998 to the relatively peaceful period in 2000, images with 
peacemaking or peace building content completely disappeared from 
publication, while the proportion of images reflecting violent and other 
themes did not materially change. Of note, in 2000, several outlets did not 
even publish any images on 12th or 13th of July, or published very few 
photographs on those specific dates, in marked contrast to their output 
during the corresponding dates in 1996 and 1998, which were characterized 
by violence. 
 
In this cross-sectional multi-year study, consistent with the hypothesis, no 
correlation was observed between the content of published images and the 
level of violence or relative peace across the years of study of the Drumcree 
parades in Portadown, Northern Ireland. Of chief importance, peaceful 
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content did not appear during the most peaceful period of the study and was 
also overall poorly represented in all other years. 
 
5.3 Discussion 
 
Wolfsfeld has noted that no major studies have examined the role of the 
news media in an ongoing peace process.299 Similarly, none have evaluated 
the role of photography in news media coverage of peace. Relatively 
autonomous news media have nevertheless the potential to exert influence 
on a peace process.300 In particular, journalists’ selection of sources and their 
emphasis on specific narratives, individual events, or conflictual aspects can 
significantly affect the interpretation of a peace process.301,302 In fact, “some 
of the most important effects of the media on the prospects for peace take 
place long before the negotiations begin”.303 In the present work, however, 
the media do not appear to have selected any peace narrative. 
 
The paucity of images that reflect a peace narrative identified in this work, 
despite political changes supporting a peace process during the study period, 
suggests that the press does not emphasize or engage its audience in the 
peace process through its use of imagery. Traditional values of the news 
media – immediacy, drama, simplicity, and ethnocentrism – shape “what is 
and is not considered news” and may impede the coverage of a peace 
                                                
299 (Wolfsfeld, 2004), p.8 
300 Ibid, p.10 
301 Ibid, p.12 
302 (Sparre, 2001), p.90 
303 Ibid, p.23 
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process.304 In fact, as reported by Wolfsfeld, “a fundamental contradiction 
between the nature of a peace process and news values” contributes to the 
press assuming “a destructive role in attempts at making peace”.305 The 
absence of photography aimed at peace building and at bringing agency to 
depictions of peace directly facilitates this deleterious role.  
 
Although political changes may precede changes in media coverage, such as 
a shift to “Pro-Peace frames”306 in text reports and editorials,307 the present 
work did find such an adoption of Pro-Peace coverage to be reflected in the 
press photography during the period of political changes concurrent with this 
study. Despite peaceful developments and diminished aggression in 
Northern Ireland in 2000, the press neglected to report or explore such 
events, at least in its photography, while accentuating aggression in earlier 
years. This work parallels prior observations made about textual media and 
news stories: “[the media] devote almost all of their attention to confrontation 
and violence and mostly ignore areas of cooperation and reconciliation”.308 
 
In general, news media can impact a peace process through four 
mechanisms: defining the political atmosphere; influencing the nature of the 
debate; affecting the strategy and behaviour of antagonists; and raising or 
lowering the public standing and legitimacy of antagonists in the peace 
process.309 Focus on a “calm political environment” is paramount to the 
                                                
304 Ibid, p.15 
305 Ibid, p.15 
306 Ibid, p.163 
307 Ibid, p.164 
308 Ibid, p.24 
309 Ibid, p.11 
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promotion of peace.310 Further, “by modifying images of the enemy, the press 
can play just as important a role in mobilizing the public for peace as it does 
for war”, as well as “soften[ing] images of the enemy”.311 Similarly, the 
“portrayal of proponents and opponents to a peace process” impact the level 
of public support for each political stakeholder.312 As the media tend to cover 
personalities rather than institutions,313 the opportunity exists for portrayals of 
individuals contributing to peace motives. Through images as well as text, 
“the more knowledge and awareness citizens have of these problems, the 
more they can become critical consumers of news”.314 
 
As suggested by Schwartz,315 our individual and collective choices “[shape] 
the final printed photograph”, which at first seems to be primarily influenced 
by “the agency and the intent of the photographer”. Sontag agreed in part: “it 
is always the image that someone chose; to photograph is to frame, and to 
frame is to exclude”.316 However, Sontag posits that a photograph’s “moral 
and emotional weight depends on where it is inserted”, its meaning changing 
“according to the context in which it is seen…”.317 In Regarding the Pain of 
Others,318 she argues also that “the photographer’s intentions do not 
determine the meaning of the photograph, which will have its own career, 
blown by the whims and loyalties of the diverse communities that have use 
for it”. Further, Sontag characterized the photograph as “always an object in 
                                                
310 Ibid, p.20 
311 Ibid, p.14 
312 Ibid, p.14 
313 Ibid, p.20 
314 Ibid, p.22 
315 (Schwartz, 1992), p.96 
316 (Sontag, 2003), p.46 
317 (Sontag, 1990), p.105-6 
318 (Sontag, 2003), p.39 
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a context”, which is apt to change.319 The transience of that context suggests 
that certain images, even if non-peaceful in the short-term, carry potentially 
constructive long-term value: “the context which shapes whatever immediate 
– in particular, political – uses the photograph may have is inevitably 
succeeded by contexts in which such uses are weakened and become 
progressively less relevant”.320 In particular, the social context that gave rise 
to an image may be at variance with the social relationships within which the 
image is embedded at any given time that the image is viewed. 
 
Photojournalists value the “emotional impact” of photographs in spot news 
assignments.321  Indeed, photographers tend to “concentrate on the human 
element of any tragedy”.322 However, the durable value of such ‘emotional’ 
imagery, or the horrifying photo, is markedly limited. Photographs “shock 
insofar as they show something novel. Unfortunately, the ante keeps getting 
raised – partly through the very proliferation of such images of horror”.323 
Indeed, while “photographs can distress”, “the aestheticizing tendency of 
photography is such that the medium which conveys distress ends by 
neutralizing it”.324 
 
Violent media images also carry implications for future acts of violence and 
public policy, acting as agents that, at the very least, accelerate political 
changes in society.325 The influence of media accounts dictating policy was 
apparent in the Bosnian War: “when Bosnian Serbs fired a single mortar shell 
                                                
319 (Sontag, 1990), p.106 
320 Ibid, p. 106 
321 (Schwartz, 1992), p.100 
322 Ibid, p.100 
323 (Sontag, 1990), p.19 
324 Ibid, p.109-10 
325 (Wolfsfeld, 2004), p.29 
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into a Sarajevo bread queue, in local terms it was not an especially shocking 
atrocity. It was the fact that it was captured on film that made the difference, 
and prompted a threat of military action by NATO”.326 Indeed, “living with the 
photographed images of suffering … does not necessarily strengthen 
conscience and the ability to be compassionate. It can also corrupt them”.327 
McGoldrick and Lynch explain that the defining aspects of War Journalism 
“lead us … to overvalue violent, reactive responses to conflict, and 
undervalue non-violent, development ones”.328 With the latter, photographs 
representing peace may avoid or even reverse this pattern, taking an 
alternate route to “the road of seeing more – and more” images of 
suffering.329 A seminal example of a peace photograph can be found on the 
front page of The Belfast Telegraph on April 11, 1998: “a rather large and 
moving picture of two women – one Protestant and one Catholic – praying at 
the respective churches … [with a] caption that reads ‘United in Prayer for 
Peace’”.330 
 
While coverage of conflict is “replete with striking, dramatic images” and 
“exciting”, the “role of the news media in a peace process … is usually more 
hidden and subtle” and “complicated”.331  Political waves, which are “sudden 
and significant changes in the political environment … characterized by a 
substantial increase in … public attention centered on a political issue or 
event”, are commonplace after violence or aggression.332 Press amplification 
of such waves may not occur or be as apparent in the coverage of a peace 
                                                
326 (Allen & Seaton, 1999), p.39 
327 (Sontag, 1990), p.19 
328 (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005), p.197 
329 (Sontag, 1990), p.20 
330 (Wolfsfeld, 2004), p.168 
331 Ibid, p.9 
332 Ibid, p.32 
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process. Photographs representing peace building may not “operate at the 
[same] level of emotional response” as those that exemplify conflict. This 
obstacle may be a further reason for which peace photographs, opportunities 
for which are already relegated to general news assignments, are so limited.  
 
As well, media frames are important in providing “an interpretive theme that 
govern the collection of information and the construction of new stories”.333 
The “narrative frame” deployed in most news events emphasizes the 
“starring actors” while “masking complexity and diffusing critical response”,334 
limiting the opportunity to understand the important “Peace frame” underlying 
negotiations.335 While involved journalists may not be documenting violence 
because it has indeed abated, the lack of photographs depicting violence 
does not necessarily convey the presence of peace. Moreover, journalists 
need to better identify and capture images that reflect peaceful 
circumstances or a negotiation process: the media instead perceives the lack 
of dramatic, physical events as an absence of ‘things happening’ – or events 
worth photographing. Seeing the image of peace as a ‘thing happening’, an 
objet trouvé, will be transformative. 
 
Peace content in photojournalism may also be limited by the self-perceptions 
of journalists. Media outlets and journalists “do not generally examine the 
assumptions underlying [their] decisions” in producing content, “their impact 
in shaping public understanding”, or “their influence over the actions and 
                                                
333 Ibid, p.36 
334 (Schwartz, 1992), p.108 
335 (Wolfsfeld, 2004), p.37 
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motivations of parties to the conflict”.336 Journalists act instead as 
“gatekeepers” in news coverage, and how they decide on material for 
publication reflects their values and the criteria for publication of images and 
other content.337 In some instances, news media are more likely to assume a 
“negative role in the [peace] process” in the context of an increasing number 
and severity of crises during that process.338  
 
Therefore, as an alternate approach, I propose that Peace Photojournalism 
can both communicate and shape a peaceful dialogue in increments over an 
extended time frame. At variance with Sontag, who believed that 
photography is “an act of non-intervention”,339 Peace Photojournalism can 
advance peaceful actions and solutions to conflict, and like Peace Journalism, 
may “build an awareness of non-violence and creativity into the practical job 
of everyday editing and reporting”.340  Wolfsfeld posits that “changes in 
coverage have the potential of making a positive contribution to the 
promotion of peace” and that “changes in setting, stories, emotional tone, 
and language may very well serve to reduce tensions between the 
antagonists”.341 Similar changes in accompanying photographic coverage of 
peace and conflict could be similarly constructive. 
  
Strobel provides case examples that “the media can exert influence on policy 
regarding peace operations”, and the numerous factors that determine 
                                                
336 (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005), p.196 
337 Ibid, p.196 
338 (Wolfsfeld, 2004), p.30 
339 (Sontag, 1990), p.6 
340 (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005), p.5 
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whether they do “are within government officials’ power to control”.342 The 
characteristics of peace operations, the nature of military missions, and, to a 
lesser degree, the capabilities of the press all influence such responses by 
officials and the role of news media.343 Further, “if properly understood and 
utilized, the very news media that at times seem to be the enemy of peace 
operations can help increase public understanding for an operation before 
and during its execution”.344 Crucially, since peace operations are generally 
“transparent”, “the instruments of communication become integral to their 
failure or success”, which depends also on “local consensus and domestic 
support for the mission”.345 Through political waves, the press can help 
garner support for a peace process by covering a “major breakthrough in 
negotiations”, conferring also to government “political and media 
advantages”.346  
                                                
342 (Strobel, 1997), p.211 
343 Ibid, p.212-13 
344 Ibid, p.213 
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346 (Wolfsfeld, 2004), p.34 
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Conclusions 
 
Peace Journalism offers a fresh approach to conflict transformation in 
illustrating the promise of a new form of journalism that expands and includes 
the opportunities for conflict transformation in covering the news. In the past, 
much academic research has been devoted to the way conflict is covered in 
the media, as well as the possibilities of Peace Journalism to alter coverage 
in the future. In addition, there has been research regarding the way in which 
photojournalism covers conflicts through images in the mainstream press. 
However, there has been little consideration of how the media, and more 
specifically photojournalism covers peace, conflict transformation or peace 
processes – both in print and online. Such limitations provided the motivation 
for the proposed concept of Peace Photojournalism. 
 
Underlying the hypothesis of this paper was an assumption in which 
mainstream photojournalism would not discernibly change over the course of 
a peace process in the types or content of images pro-offered. This paper 
considered the example of Northern Ireland in the coverage of 
photojournalism prior, during and following the peace process to assess if 
this limited change was in fact observed, or whether changes have been 
documented with different types of images to mark the political changes 
inherent in the system. In considering this question, the normative 
assumption is taken that the images being used should change prior, during 
and post peace process to reflect the changes in society and the political 
system at large – in effect, documenting the process of conflict 
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transformation. Such changes were however not observed in this case study 
in Northern Ireland. 
 
But then the question arises: why does this matter? And this leads to a 
further normative assumption: that in photo-documenting conflict 
transformation in this way, Peace Photojournalism will contribute itself to the 
process of conflict transformation. Of course, the correlation between 
photojournalism documenting conflict transformation, thereby contributing to 
it is more difficult to prove. Although beyond the remit of this paper, one can 
consider the need for audience attitudinal studies and content analyses to 
assess the impact of photojournalism images of peace on the psyches of the 
protagonists on the conflict. Not an unachievable task, although with major 
challenges. One key problem involves how to assess the relative impact of 
news images and print. Although anecdotally, if one considers the role of 
news propaganda and many other ways to control the news, then one can 
understand its potential power to shape the minds of its’ readers.  
 
Current Implications of Research 
 
The findings of this research carry relevance for the coverage of 
contemporary conflicts and their resolution. Chief among current conflicts is 
the Syrian Peace Process over the course of this decade. While the 
prevalent images remain those of the violence in the Syrian Civil War and the 
misery of migration, few have highlighted the early initiatives of the Arab 
League, the numerous UN-led Geneva Conferences on Syria between 2014 
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and 2017, or the multi-national discussions of the Vienna Process since 2015. 
An example of a peace-relevant image is that of Christians and Muslims 
meeting alongside Arab League monitors in Damascus in 2012.347 Most 
recently, the peace-building role of Kazakhstan in hosting peace talks with 
rebel leadership has seen limited photographic coverage, examples of which 
can be found in the International Meeting on Syrian Settlement in Astana, 
Kazakhstan in 2017.348 
 
In the last decade, coverage of events by the mainstream press and other 
media has shifted from a physical print configuration to electronic and online 
formats. The importance of this analysis, which was centered on newsprint 
journalism, is only heightened in the current climate of the rapid news cycle, 
the online coverage of conflict by media and stakeholders, and the 
predominance of the image in any electronic platform. While news agencies 
have transferred their traditional modes of reporting into an electronic format 
with the same rigorous journalism, the proliferation of media outlets, the 
competition between them, and the speed of the internet have created a 
shortened news cycle, an intense pressure to be the first to report, and the 
potential for news images to be uploaded to the web without editorial scrutiny. 
Potential implications of these developments include the aggravation of 
conflict and overlooking peaceful imagery, as photos can be posted hastily 
online and without due consideration to the necessary context and their 
impact on the peace process. 
 
                                                
347 Available at: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AVOA_Arrott_-_A_View_of_Syria%2C_Under_Government_Crackdown_09.jpg  
348 Available at: http://www.voanews.com/a/russia-turkey-iran-monitor-syrian-truce-rebels-skeptical/3691252.html  
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Challenges and Future Research 
 
The findings of this analysis suggest that photographic journalism was not 
used to advance peaceful content or the elements of the peace process, and 
did not serve to diminish the portrayal of violence and aggression whether 
prior to, at the peak of, or following violent conflict in Portadown, Northern 
Ireland. More broadly, such journalism failed to recognize or to grasp 
opportunities in photography to promote peaceful exchange between 
affected parties, non-violent conflict resolution, moral position favouring 
peace, and major developments in the peace process. News media can 
however elevate the legitimacy of groups working for peace and transform 
images of the ‘other’.349  The manner in which news media, including 
photographers, “relate to the process can have a significant influence on 
public perceptions and attitudes” of a conflict and its resolution.350 As noted 
by Shaw,351 the most lacking ingredient to achieving such a function “is the 
ability of people in conflict situations to represent themselves. Western-
dominated global media rarely take seriously the self-representation of 
individuals, communities, and organizations in zones of conflict”. I propose 
that the form of photographic journalism respecting all of these principles be 
defined as the discipline of ‘Peace Photojournalism’. Future work in this area 
would develop a model, similar to that formulated by Galtung for Peace 
Journalism and tabled earlier, setting out the analytical and fieldwork 
methods applicable to photographic media and its captions. 
 
                                                
349 (Wolfsfeld, 2004), p.1 
350 Ibid, p.43 
351 (Shaw, 1996), p.182 
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The present work suggests additional areas of study and important questions 
essential to the contemporary development of Peace Photojournalism. First, 
whether in electronic (online) or print format, do images influence conflict, 
and if so, to what extent? For example, evaluating how media images shape 
our perceptions of ‘the other’ and our responses would be useful. Similarly, in 
what ways are each faction’s perceptions of a conflict influenced by images 
portrayed in the media, in the absence of the Peace Journalism approach? 
The media environment, defined as “the aggregate of professional beliefs, 
values and routines that journalists employ” in press coverage,352 merits 
close scrutiny. For instance, it is important to identify the factors, both in the 
political environment and in the media environment, that influence the extent 
to which the press occupy a constructive position in a peace process.353 
Despite the dearth of compatible photographs, the media environment in 
Northern Ireland became “more conducive to peace”, with the press able “to 
play a more constructive role” over the period of the present study.354 Certain 
environments “are more likely to produce positive news about peace 
because they fundamentally alter their journalists’ working assumptions”.355 
Finally, we lack the theoretical tools and understanding to analyze the type of 
communicative strategies that could strengthen peace.356 
 
Peace Photojournalism, as an applied training activity counter to ‘War 
Journalism’, could have a long-term impact on the prospects for peace in 
many parts of the world. Initially, the principles of Peace Photojournalism 
                                                
352 (Wolfsfeld, 2004), p.38-39 
353 Ibid, p.25 
354 Ibid, p.159 
355 Ibid, p.44 
356 (Varis, 1987), p.361 
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merit further discussion. Future research could also include interviews with 
experts and research organizations currently exploring the links between 
peace journalism, peace-building and non-violent conflict resolution, to 
consider possible areas for future analysis and convergence, both in 
academic research and in field practice. Examining whether and how Peace 
Photojournalism contributes to a peace process and to building peace will be 
vital in the decades ahead.  
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APPENDIX 
Table 2. Summary of Published Images by Newspaper 
for July Portadown parades in 1996, 1998, and 2000∗ 
 
Northern Ireland 
 
1a. The Irish News – July 1996 
 
 
 
Year 
 
Date 
(July) 
 
Page 
# 
 
Photo 
# 
 
Image Content 
 
 
# 
 
Type 
 
1996 8th 1 1 Law and Orange Order… the 
Orangemen are stopped at 
Drumcree by lines of RUC 
yesterday 
 
1 DC 
1996 8th 1 1 Standoff and Deliver…two 
marchers at Drumcree try to take 
up a collection from a row of 
RUC men yesterday 
2 DC 
1996 8th 3 1 Drawing the Line…Unionist Party 
leader David Trimble and Orange 
Order Grand Master the Rev 
Martin Smyth face an 
impenetrable barrier of police 
yesterday at Drumcree 
 
3 DC 
1996 8th 5 1 RUC-TING Comfortably… time 
out for the police at yesterday’s 
standoff 
[officers sleeping in a row against 
their riot shields] 
4 PAB 
1996 8th 5 2 Immovable Faith… protesters 
gather in front of the church at 
the centre of the standoff 
 
5 MP 
1996 8th 5 3 Flown In… police with riot shields 
arrive at Drumcree in a Chinook 
yesterday 
[police walking from a helicopter 
with their shields] 
6 PAB 
1996 8th 5 4 Bowing Out… Sir Patrick 7 PP 
                                                
∗ Abbreviations for Type of Image: DC, Direct Confrontation; PAB, Police/Authority/Barriers; VV, Visible Violence/Results of 
Violent Acts; VI, ‘Victims’; MP, Mass of Protesters; MA, Marching; PP, Portraits of Major Players; SSM, 
Signs/Symbols/Maps Related to Conflict; CI, Comic Illustration of Conflict; PM, Peacemaking/Portraits Depicting Peace. 
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Mayhew  
[headshot] 
 
1996 12th 1 1 Front Page Title: Betrayed: Who 
rules Northern Ireland? 
Shocked… Sarah Dorian and 
Natalie Corbett watch the Orange 
parade on television in a hostel 
where they are living after being 
driven out of their home  
[portrait of the girls] 
8 VI 
1996 12th 1 2 Below the Front Page Line: Who 
Rules Northern Ireland? 
[Picture of the Orangemen 
marching and being protected by 
the RUC down Garvaghy Road] 
9 MA 
1996 12th 6 1 Fire… RUC riot squad fire plastic 
bullets at protesters on the 
Garvaghy Road in Portadown 
[lots of RUC firing guns] ** 
10 VV 
1996 12th 6 2 Dragged… Nationalist protesters 
are dragged off the Garvaghy 
Road by the RUC ** 
 
11 VV 
1996 12th 6 3 View… Orangemen pass the 
RUC riot squad as they 
eventually get down the 
Garvaghy Road 
12 MA 
1996 12th 6 4 Strangle Hold… Catholic 
protesters are removed from 
Garvaghy Road by the RUC 
[protesters being violently pulled 
and dragged]  
13 VV 
1996 12th 7 1 Restraint… Gerry Adams ++ 
 
14 PM 
1996 12th 7 2 Anger… John Hume 
 
15 PP 
1996 12th 7 3 Questions… Seamus Mallon 
 
16 PP 
1996 12th 9 1 Confrontation… yet again 
Drumcree has been the scene of 
clashes between Orangemen, 
security forces and Nationalist 
residents (in Letters to the 
Editor/Opinion) 
[Orangemen marching and a 
policeman standing by] 
17 MA 
1996 12th 20 1 Defiance… a Nationalist raises 
his fist after a minivan is torched 
at Garvaghy 
18 SSM 
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[protester and minivan on fire] ** 
1996 12th 20 2 Black Day… Cardinal Daly 
[portrait] 
19 PP 
 
1996 
12th 20 3 Disbelieving… Brid Rodgers saw 
police tactics in Garvaghy Road 
[portrait of SDLP leader] 
20 PP 
1996 13th  5 1 Flashback… the RUC and 
Orange demonstrators during the 
Drumcree stand-off 
[demonstrators and RUC 
standing facing one another 
below the shadow of Drumcree 
church] 
21 DC 
1996 13th 6 1 COMIC: Depicting that history 
has not changed from 1920 & 
1996 
[the second picture is of Trimble 
in an Orange outfit marching in 
front of Orangemen below the 
Drumcree church] 
22 CI 
1996 13th 7 1 Point of Principle… PUP leader 
David Ervine says Orangemen 
should have held talks with 
Breandan MacCionnaith in a bid 
to reach agreement over the 
Garvaghy Road dispute 
[portrait] ++ 
23 PM 
1996 13th 10 1 Albert Reynolds… ‘Anger and 
Dismay’ ++ 
[portrait – described in the article 
as a ‘peacemaker’] 
 
24 PM 
1996 13th 10 2 Flatly Put… a threat to burn the 
church at the centre of the 
Drumcree stand-off appeared 
overnight at Artillery Flats in the 
new Lodge and could be clearly 
seen by Orangemen on their 
parade route ** 
25 VV 
    
 
Total 25  
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1b. The Irish News – July 1998 
 
 
 
Year 
 
Date 
(July) 
 
Page 
# 
 
Photo 
# 
 
Image Content 
 
 
# 
 
Type 
 
1998 6th  1 
 
1 COMIC: Two Orangemen shivering 
in the rainy cold saying: “Quite 
Honestly, I wish someone did have 
the right to stop us standing here for 
365 days!  
[perhaps a reference to the 
Drumcree protests by Orangemen] 
1 CI 
1998 6th 3 1 Stand-Off… Portadown Orangemen 
gather outside Drumcree Church 
yesterday after they were barred 
from returning from a church service 
via the Garvaghy Road. They have 
vowed to stand their ground until 
they are allowed to return to their 
Orange hall via the Nationalist 
stronghold 
 
2 MP 
1998 6th 3 2 MAP: Contentious Route… The red 
area shows the route the 
Orangemen wish to take, from 
Drumcree Church, down the 
Nationalist Garvaghy Road, along 
Market Street and Church Street, 
ending at Carlton Street Orange hall 
 
3 SSM 
1998 6th 4 1 The Wire… a Northern Ireland flag 
lies draped over barbed wire near 
Drumcree church yesterday 
 
4 SSM 
1998 6th 4 2 
(group) 
Grouping of six photos of ‘The key 
players at Drumcree’ ** 
[portraits and descriptions of: Ronnie 
Flanagan, Breadan Mac Cionnaith, 
Harold Gracey, Alistair Graham, 
David Trimble, Mo Mowlam] 
 
5 PP 
1998 6th 5 1 Fly the Flag… a Union flag flies from 
the top of a Church of Ireland church 
yesterday 
 
6 SSM 
1998 6th 5 2 Through the Barricades… Some of 
the Orangemen taking part in the 
stand-off at Drumcree church peer 
through the barbed wire erected by 
7 DC 
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the security forces to stop them 
walking down Garvaghy Road 
1998 6th 6 1 (Top of Page: Turning the pages of 
history – how the standoffs began) ** 
First year… the 1995 standoff as 
reported by the Irish News set the 
pattern for following years 
[picture of 1995 front page] 
 
8 SSM 
1998 6th 6 2 (Top of Page: Turning the pages of 
history – how the standoffs began) ** 
All Too Familiar… how the Irish 
News reported the turn of events 
after the Drumcree Orange march 
was pushed through in July 1996 
[picture of 1996 front page] 
 
9 SSM 
1998 6th  6 3 (Top of Page: Turning the pages of 
history – how the standoffs began) ** 
Confrontation… violence erupted in 
Nationalist areas last year after the 
parade was forced down the 
Garvaghy Road 
[picture of 1997 front page] 
 
10 SSM 
1998 6th 10 1 On the March… Orangemen are 
stopped on the road from Drumcree 
Church towards Garvaghy Road 
(opinion) 
11 DC 
1998 13th  1 1 (Above the Headline: ‘Rest in Peace’ 
with a poem below) 
The Quinn brothers: Jason (8) dead; 
Mark (9), dead; Lee (12), survived; 
Richard (10) dead 
[family portrait of the four boys] 
12 VI 
1998 13th 2 1 
(group) 
[Photo grouping of 2 photos with no 
caption; perhaps nun and a local in 
Portadown?] 
13 PM 
1998 13th 3 1 
(group) 
[Photo grouping of three boys, each 
picture with a caption below that 
states their names as follows: 
Murdered: Jason, aged eight 
Murdered: Mark, aged nine 
Murdered: Richard, aged 10 
14 VI 
1998 13th 6 1 Looking On… Orangemen at 
Drumcree admire the fortifications 
preventing them from getting down 
the Garvaghy Road 
[four Orangemen looking at a 
barbed-wire fence] 
15 DC 
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1998 13th 5 1 Outraged… Bertie Ahern 
[portrait accompanying an article 
about the deaths of the children and 
a call for peace/resolution] 
16 PM 
1998 13th  7 1 New Painting… artists from Belfast, 
helped by youths from the Garvaghy 
estate, on Saturday painted a new 
mural on the Garvaghy Road ** 
[boy walking past the new mural] 
17 SSM 
1998 13th  7 2 End Protest… Jack Straw [portrait… 
talks about Rule of Law] 
 
18 PP 
1998 13th  7  3 Appeal… Archbishop Sean Brady 
[portrait … talks about the need for 
communication and resolution 
between communities] 
19 PM 
1998 13th 8 1 Lone Thinker… an Orangeman at 
Drumcree contemplates the eighth 
day of the standoff [Orangeman 
sitting near the barbed wire] 
20 DC 
1998 13th  8 2 Judgment Criticised… President 
Mary McAleese has come under fire 
from the Ireland on Sunday 
newspaper for hosting a twelfth of 
July garden party for Orangemen as 
Aras an Uachtarian over the 
weekend [portrait] 
21 PP 
1998                                                                                                              13th 10 1 Undue Influence… Joel Patton and 
his followers appear to be drowning 
out the voices of more moderate 
Orangemen 
[portrait] 
22 PP 
    
 
Total 22  
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1c. The Irish News – July 2000 
 
 
 
Year 
 
Date 
(July) 
 
Page 
# 
 
Photo 
# 
 
Image Content 
 
 
# 
 
Type 
 
2000 10th 1 1 Back Again: Johnny Adair. Left, 
arriving at Drumcree church last 
night where he mingled with 
protesting Orangemen 
[Former UFF leader Johnny Adair 
with Orangemen] 
1 PP 
2000 10th 3 1 Down to the Wire: Portadown 
Orangemen walk past a razor wire 
cordon erected by the security forces 
near St. John’s Catholic Church 
 
2 DC 
2000 10th 3 2 ‘Fears’: SDLP minister Brid Rodgers 
 
3 PP 
2000 10th 4 1 [Reverend Dr Robert Eames, 
Archbishop of Armagh standing at a 
lectern accompanying a statement 
and a letter from Orangemen] 
4 PP 
2000 10th 7 1 COMIC: concerning the Orangemen, 
parade re-routing and the parades 
commission and basically the 
insinuation of how the Orangemen 
think the entire Drumcree event is a 
joke 
 
5 CI 
2000 12th 1 1 Geared Up: Police in riot gear 
prepare for more Loyalist 
demonstrations in support of 
Drumcree Orangemen in north 
Belfast yesterday 
(under headline: ‘Stop the Violence’) 
 
6 PAB 
2000 12th 7 1 Respect: Brid Rodgers turns another 
page in her political career with a 
central role in defending Nationalist 
rights in Portadown 
[portrait in shadow] 
7 PP 
2000 12th 8 1 
(group) 
[Series of four photos under the 
headline ‘Protests lead to orgy of 
violence’ which shows forms of 
protest in areas other than 
Portadown, but in support of 
Drumcree, such as: billboards, 
protests, an RUC found petrol-bomb-
making factory and a tricolour flag 
8 PAB 
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burning] 
2000 12th 11 1 COMIC: about the orange parades 
 
9 CI 
2000 13th 3 1 Crowd Control: Police fire a water 
cannon at Loyalist rioters in 
Portadown early yesterday morning 
as violence continued for the 11th 
night in a row. A blast bomb was 
thrown at police lines and a soldier 
was set alight with a petrol bomb 
(Under the headline: “‘Peaceful 
protests’ cause more mayhem”) 
 
10 VV 
2000 13th 7 1 Medium Scrum: Even when 
journalists are able to report from the 
Orange Order’s side of the police 
lines, they can be subjected to both 
verbal and physical abuse from 
Loyalists. In one incident, a 
cameraman’s stepladder became a 
weapon to throw at troops taking 
cover behind barricades 
[An Orangemen gathering] 
(Under the headline: “No news is 
good news from the hill at 
Drumcree”) 
 
11 MP 
2000 13th 8 1 Heading Home: An Orangeman 
holding a decorative pikestaff 
watches brethren leave the Co 
Armagh  
[article is about Orange leaders 
calling for peaceful protest] 
 
12 MP 
 
 
   Total 12  
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2a. Belfast Telegraph – July 1996 
 
 
 
Year 
 
Date 
(July) 
 
Page # 
 
Photo 
# 
 
Image Content 
 
 
# 
 
Type 
 
1996 8th  1 (late) 1 Parade Stand-off: The scene at 
Drumcree early this morning as 
Loyalist numbers started to build 
up for the second day of the 
confrontation. 
 
1 MA 
1996 8th  3 (late) 1 Torched wreckage: Forty-eight 
cars and vans from Lindsay Cars, 
off the Larne Road Link at 
Ballymena, were burnt out and 
another fifty were damaged. 
 
2 VV 
1996 8th  3 (late) 2 Written off: A motor mechanic 
from Lindsay Cars, Ballymena, 
checks over one of the burnt-out 
vehicles taken from their 
compound last night. 
 
3 VV 
1996 8th  4 (late) 1 No entry: Orange Order members 
from the country area of 
Portadown block traffic from 
entering Portadown town centre, 
today. 
 
4 MA 
1996 8th  4 (late) 2 Under cover: Orangemen slept 
out overnight in tents erected in 
the graveyard at Drumcree. 
 
5 MP 
1996 8th  5 1 Tight spot: Ulster Unionist leader 
David Trimble squeezes through 
the RUC line after negotiations 
with senior RUC officers. 
 
6 PP 
1996 8th  9 (late) 1 The Drumcree stand-off 
continues as protestors stand 
face to face with RUC officers. ** 
 
7 DC 
1996 8th  9 (late) 2 An Orangeman stares at the 
police lines at Drumcree while his 
colleagues find something to 
smile about. 
 
8 DC 
1996 8th  9 (late) 3 RUC officers take a break from 
the front-line confrontation. 
9 PAB 
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1996 8th  9 (late) 4 A sea of orange: The scene at 
Drumcree as thousands of 
Orangemen confront the RUC. 
 
10 DC 
1996 12th  3 (late) 1 Burning passions: A masked 
man, fist raised in a salute, 
watches as a car burns on. ** 
 
11 VV 
1996 12th   3 (late) 2 Home straight: Orangemen and 
their supporters wait at the end of 
the Garvaghy Road to greet the 
marchers. 
12 MA 
1996 12th  5 (late) 1 Moving on: Orangemen move 
through the barbed wire barrier at 
Drumcree to walk down the 
Garvaghy Road. ** 
13 DC 
1996 13th 3 
(morning) 
1 Night fights: Fireworks and arc 
lights lit up the sky at the 
confrontation point outside 
Drumcree Church. 
14 MP 
1996 13th 3 
(morning) 
2 Marching through: Orangemen 
from Portadown district parade 
along Garvaghy Road, protected 
on all sides by a heavy RUC 
presence. 
15 MA 
1996 13th 3 
(morning) 
3 Road clashes: TUC officers 
cleared Nationalist protesters 
from the Garvaghy Road. 
16 PAB 
    Total 16  
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2b. Belfast Telegraph – July 1998 
 
 
 
Year 
 
Date 
(July) 
 
Page 
# 
 
Photo 
# 
 
Image Content 
 
 
# 
 
Type 
 
1998 6th 1 
(late) 
1 Frontline: Orangemen watch and wait 
at the Army security trench as the 
event of Day 2 at Drumcree unfold. **  
[photo of the British flag flying with 
Drumcree church in the background] 
 
1 SSM 
1998 6th 5 
(late) 
1 The Orangemen are stopped by a 
sea of media and barbed wire when 
re-routed from the Garvaghy Road. 
 
2 MP 
1998 6th 5 
(late) 
2 The thousands of Orangemen 
standing outside Drumcree Church. 
 
3 MP 
1998 6th 7 
(late) 
1 On the walk: Orangemen make their 
way to Drumcree Church alongside a 
heavy military presence. 
 
4 MP 
1998 6th 7 
(late) 
2 Breandan MacCionnaith being 
interviewed after having been refused 
entry to the road near Drumcree 
Church. [portrait] 
 
5 PP 
1998 6th 7 
(late) 
3 Guard duty: Police officers ring St. 
John’s Catholic Church as the 
Orange marchers pass on their way 
to Drumcree. 
 
6 PAB 
1998 13th   No images printed for July 13th on 
Drumcree 
 
*  
    Total 
 
6  
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2c. Belfast Telegraph – July 2000 
 
 
 
Year 
 
Date 
(July) 
 
Page 
# 
 
Photo 
# 
 
Image Content 
 
 
# 
 
Type 
 
2000 10th 1 
(late) 
1 Portadown Orange leader Harold 
Gracey speaking to the crowds at 
Drumcree yesterday. 
 
1 PP 
2000 10th 3 
(late) 
1 Orangemen walk past razor wire on 
their way to Drumcree. 
 
2 DC 
2000 10th 4 
(late) 
1 Orange Order members leaving the 
scene after yesterday’s address by 
Portadown Orange leader Harold 
Gracey at the Drumcree security 
barrier. 
 
3 MP 
2000 10th 4 
(late) 
2 Leading Loyalist Johnny Adair joins 
the crowd at Drumcree last night. 
 
4 PP 
2000 10th 5 
(late) 
1 Orangemen gather at the barrier. 
Police did not appear to receive their 
letter of protest. 
 
5 DC 
2000 10th 5 
(late) 
2 Harold Gracey walks towards the 
security barrier after yesterday’s 
service in Drumcree. 
 
6 PAB 
2000 10th 11 
(late) 
1 [Orangemen with a banner flying 
overhead and the Drumcree church 
below] ** 
 
7 MP 
    Total 7  
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3a. Portadown Times – July 1996 
 
 
 
Year 
 
Date 
(July) 
 
Page 
# 
 
Photo 
# 
 
Image Content 
 
 
# 
 
Type 
 
1996 11th     
(8th) 
1 1 The Drumcree parade approaches 
the police lines after the church 
service on Sunday. Leading the 
way are, left to right, David Trimble 
MP, Jeffrey Donaldson, Assistant 
Grand Master of the Orange Lodge 
of Ireland, the Rev Martin Smyth, 
Grand Master of the Orange Lodge 
of Ireland, Harold Gracey, District 
Master Portadown LOL, and 
George Patton, Executive Officer of 
the Orange Lodge of Ireland. 
1 
 
DC 
1996 11th   
(8th) 
2 1 Protesters gather to block the Bann 
Bridge at Edenderry on Monday 
afternoon 
 
2 
 
MP 
1996 11th   
(8th) 
2 2 Ulster Unionist leader David 
Trimble puts an orange lily on his 
collarette before taking part in 
Sunday’s Orange parade. Mr. 
Trimble is a member of Bangor 
District and has taken part in each 
Drumcree parade since being 
elected MP for Upper Bann in 1990 
3 
 
PP 
1996 11th   
(8th) 
3 1 The message is clear from this 
protester at Drumcree stand off 
 
4 
 
VI 
1996 11th   
(8th) 
4 1 Waiting Game: The waiting begins 
for protesters and police outside 
Drumcree Church after marchers 
were prevented from making their 
way along the Garvaghy Road 
5 
 
PAB 
1996 11th   
(8th) 
5 1 The Drumcree parade makes its 
way towards the police lines after 
Sunday’s church service 
6 
 
 
DC 
1996 11th   
(8th) 
5 2 Alex Hyde, District standard bearer 
leads the Orangemen out of 
Carleton Street on Sunday morning 
 
7 
 
MA 
1996 11th   
(8th) 
6 1 A highjacked lorry is set ablaze at 
the town’s West Street roundabout 
 
8 
 
VV 
1996 11th   
(8th) 
6 2 On parade: Members of the 
Portadown Ex-Servicemen’s LOL 
9 
 
MA 
 129 
No. 608 parade through the town 
on Sunday morning 
 
1996 11th   
(8th) 
7 1 Strain shows: The strain shows on 
the face of the Rev Martin Smyth, 
Grand Master of the Orange Lodge 
of Ireland, as the Drumcree parade 
reaches the RUC lines on Sunday. 
 
10 
 
 
PP 
1996 11th   
(8th) 
8 1 ‘We have to stand firm’: Portadown 
LOL District Master Harold Gracey 
to the centre of attention as the 
Drumcree parade is halted by the 
RUC on Sunday 
 
11 
 
MP 
1996 11th   
(8th) 
8 2 Portadown district officers and 
visiting dignitaries lead the parade 
of 2,000 Orangemen through the 
centre of Portadown on Sunday 
morning on their way to Drumcree 
Parish Church 
12 
 
MA 
1996 11th   
(8th) 
9 1 Television journalist Kate Adie is 
famous for her coverage from 
trouble spots throughout the world. 
Sunday brought her and the world’s 
media to Portadown for the 
controversial Drumcree parade 
13 
 
SSM 
1996 11th   
(8th) 
9 2 David Trimble makes a point during 
Sunday morning’s Press 
conference in Carleton Street 
Orange Hall. Also pictured from left, 
Denis Watson, County Grand 
Master, Harold Gracey, executive 
officer of the Grand Orange Lodge 
of Ireland. 
14 
 
PP 
1996 11th   
(8th) 
10 1 Members of the LOL No.25 
parading to Drumcree on Sunday 
morning. 
15 
 
MA 
1996 11th   
(8th) 
10 2 Bowler hats, white gloves and 
umbrellas were a ‘must’ for 
members of Portadown Ex-
Servicemen’s LOL No. 608 as they 
took part in Sunday’s church 
parade 
16 
 
MA 
1996 11th   
(8th) 
10 3 Stand-off starts: A section of the 
crowd line the route from Drumcree 
church on Sunday after the RUC 
prevented the parade from making 
its way back via the Garvaghy 
Road. 
17 
 
PAB 
 130 
1996 19th 
(12/13th) 
1 1 Across the lines: So near, yet so far 
apart. A picture that sums up the 
mood of Portadown on July 11, 
1996. Orangemen finally march 
down Garvaghy Road as the local 
residents are kept back by a line of 
police in riot gear and a screen of 
Land Rovers. The dramatic change 
of heart by Chief Constable Sir 
Hugh Annesley in allowing the 
parade ended the four-day siege, 
but left the town more divided than 
ever. 
18 
 
 
PAB 
1996 19th 
(12/13th) 
2 1 A highjacked Fiat Panda blazes in 
the middle of Garvaghy Road. 
19 
 
VV 
1996 19th 
(12/13th) 
3 1 Frustration in the face of one 
woman as she surveys the scene 
during the protest. 
[close up portrait] 
20 
 
 
VI 
1996 19th 
(12/13th) 
4 1 Roman Catholic Cardinal Cahal 
Daly with the residents of Craigwell 
Avenue on the 12th night as they 
discuss the damage done during 
the previous evening. 
21 
 
 
PM 
1996 19th 
(12/13th) 
4 2 Mrs. Christine Reynolds of 
Craigwell Avenue with a concrete 
block that smashed through her 
window on the 11th night. 
22 
 
VI 
1996 19th 
(12/13th) 
4 3 Mrs. Lorraine Heath of Churchill 
Park, with daughter Orlagh (3). 
Show a plastic bullet that crashed 
through their living room window 
just before three o’clock on the 
morning of the 13th during the riots 
in the area. 
23 
 
VI 
1996 19th 
(12/13th) 
5 1 The smashed windows of Mr. David 
Webb’s home in Woodside Green. 
24 
 
VV 
1996 19th 
(12/13th) 
5 2 One of several boarded-up 
windows on Woodside Green. 
25 
 
VV 
1996 19th 
(12/13th) 
6 1 Brethren of Portadown District LOL 
no. 1 lead the marchers under the 
bridge and into Castle Street. 
26 
 
MA 
1996 19th 
(12/13th) 
6 2 Alderman Mervyn Carrick 27 
 
PP 
1996 19th 
(12/13th) 
7 1 Crowds waiting opposite 
Shillingtons wait as the Orangemen 
approach following their walk from 
Garvaghy Road. [article on bias in 
media reporting on this page] 
28 
 
MA 
1996 19th 7 2 Police move in to disperse 29 VV 
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(12/13th) protesters during the attempted 
blockage of Garvaghy Road. **  
 
1996 19th 
(12/13th) 
8 1 Face-to-face. Cardinal Cahal Daly 
and Mr. John McKeown discuss the 
happening on Craigwell Avenue, 
along with other residents of the 
street. 
30 
 
PM 
1996 19th 
(12/13th) 
8 2 Jesuit priest Fr. Brian Lennon was 
the fore at Garvaghy Road as the 
Orange parade passed through on 
Thursday. 
31 
 
PM 
1996 19th 
(12/13th) 
9 1 Upper Bann MP David Trimble 
acknowledges the reception of the 
crowds as the Orange marchers 
complete their walk from Garvaghy 
Road. 
32 
 
PP 
1996 19th 
(12/13th) 
9 2 The scene of destruction as a 
highjacked car burns in the middle 
of the Garvaghy Road. 
33 
 
VV 
1996 19th 
(12/13th) 
10 1 The massive wall of police in riot 
gear separating residents and 
protesters from the Orangemen on 
Garvaghy Road. 
[appears with the varying coverage 
and thoughts on the possibility for 
peace] 
34 
 
DC 
1996 19th 
(12/13th) 
11 1 The aftermath of violence as 
burned-out vehicles and debris lie 
strewn across Garvaghy Road. 
[appears with the varying coverage 
and thoughts on the possibility for 
peace] 
35 
 
 
VV 
1996 19th 
(12/13th) 
12 1 Sit-down protest: Tempers begin to 
fray as the police move in to break 
up the sit-down protest on the 
Garvaghy Road. 
36 
 
DC 
1996 19th 
(12/13th) 
13 1 Aftermath of the trouble: Protesters 
stand in the middle of Garvaghy 
Road as a highjacked van, toppled 
on to its side, burns amid the 
debris. 
37 
 
VV 
1996 19th 
(12/13th) 
13 2 Defiant salute: Fist clenched in 
defiance, a Garvaghy Road 
protester stands by a burning car 
during the trouble. 
38 
 
VV 
    Total 38   
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3b. Portadown Times – July 1998 
 
 
 
Year 
 
Date 
(July) 
 
Page 
# 
 
Photo 
# 
 
Image Content 
 
 
# 
 
Type 
 
1998 10th     
(6th) 
1 1 A Town Divided: There are two 
sieges in Portadown this year. The 
Siege of Drumcree and the Siege of 
Garvaghy Road. The picture shows 
the latter as Loyalists gather at the 
lower entrance to the Garvaghy 
Road where Army-erected barriers 
keep the two sides apart. The 
community and politicians in 
Garvaghy are complaining the 
people are hemmed in, and the 
protesters are regularly moved 
away by the security forces as 
Drumcree Four continues. ** 
[Headline is “The road to ruin”] 
 
1 
 
PAB 
1998 10th 
(6th) 
3 1 Councilor Joe Duffy [portrait] 
 
2 
 
PP 
1998 10th 
(6th) 
3 2 Several rallies were held in the 
centre of Portadown this week 
demanding the right to march and 
these women and children make 
their feelings clear. 
 
3 
 
MP 
1998 10th 
(6th) 
4 1 Smiles and shouts. Seamus Mallon, 
the Deputy First Minister in the 
Assembly, and his SDLP Assembly 
colleague Brid Rodgers leave the 
meeting at Churchill Park where 
some of the residents shouted and 
catcalled at them. 
[The headline of the accompanying 
article is “Peace move fails”] 
 
4 
 
PP 
1998 10th 
(6th) 
4 2 Breandan MacClonnaith briefs 
journalists after a meeting of the 
Garvaghy Road Residents’ 
Coalition.  
 
5 
 
PM 
1998 10th 
(6th) 
5 1 War veterans Albert Rusk (third 
right) and Alex Hyde (centre) and 
fellow members of the Portadown 
Ex-Servicemen’s LOL 608, with – 
from left – William Percy, Wenford 
6 
 
PAB 
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Maguire, Wesley Totten, Fred 
Oliver and Eddie Stewart. 
[group photo] 
 
1998 10th 
(6th) 
6 1 The burned-out car at the Dobbin 
area on the main Portadown-
Armagh Road on Monday. 
 
7 
 
VV 
1998 10th 
(6th) 
6 2 Surveying the scene: Breandan 
MacClonnaith watches the Orange 
parade on its way to the service at 
Drumcree Parish Church. ** 
 
8 
 
MA 
1998 10th 
(6th) 
7 1 The Orangemen came to a 
standstill at the security barrier at 
the bottom of Drumcree hill. 
 
9 
 
PAB 
1998 10th 
(6th) 
7 2 The Mayor, Alderman Mervyn 
Carrick [portrait] 
[with article calling for cool and 
failing to take sides] ** 
10 
 
PP 
1998 10th 
(6th) 
8 1 Paisley speaking with an 
unidentified man (Trimble?) and a 
police officer. 
 
11 
 
PP 
1998 10th 
(6th) 
9 1 The international media captured 
the moment on camera, on sound 
and in notebooks when Portadown 
District Master Mr. Harold Gracey 
reached the security barrier at the 
bottom of Drumcree hill on Sunday 
morning. **  
[the photo shows Gracey 
surrounded by journalists and 
photographers] 
[Also look at article with the title 
“Trimble and Mallon in plea for 
peace”] ** 
 
12 
 
PAB 
1998 10th 
(6th) 
10 1 On the march: A group of women 
and children on a protest march 
through Portadown. 
13 
 
MA 
1998 10th 
(6th) 
10 2 From a distance… Sunday 
morning’s Orange parade passes 
St John the Baptist Roman Catholic 
Church. 
14 
 
MA 
1998 10th 
(6th) 
11 1 Head start for two: Two members of 
Derryhale LOL No. 81, John Gilbert 
and Tommy Johnston in relaxed 
mood before setting out on the walk 
15 
 
PM 
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to Drumcree Parish Church on 
Sunday morning. 
1998 10th 
(6th) 
11 2 Alan Milligan (right) serves a thirsty 
customer at the temporary tea and 
sandwich stand at Drumcree. 
Townswomen from Portadown 
have organised a rota for sandwich-
making to feed the Orangemen and 
their supporters involved in the 
stand-off. 
16 
 
PM 
1998 10th 
(6th) 
13 1 Denis Watson – ‘maverick’ Ulster 
Unionist [portrait] 
17 
 
PP 
1998 10th 
(6th) 
13 2 On the line: One of the busiest men 
on the Orange side over the past 
week has been Press officer David 
Jones who was interviewed by the 
local, national and international 
media as the story unfolded. TV 
cameras wait as he conducts a 
radio interview via the vital mobile 
telephone on Monday. 
18 
 
PP 
1998 10th 
(6th) 
13 3 Mervyn Gregson with daughter 
Katie and mother Agnes. 
19 
 
PM 
1998 10th 
(6th) 
14 1 Content in tent. Sandy Hewitt, 
Worshipful Master of Battlehill LOL 
395 prepares to bed down at 
Drumcree “for as long as it takes to 
get the parade down the Garvaghy 
Road”. 
20 
 
PAB 
1998 10th 
(6th) 
15 1 On the march, with protesters held 
at bay behind barbed wire. ** 
21 
 
MA 
1998 10th 
(6th) 
34 1 All quiet at Drumcree on Saturday 
morning, as a soldier keeps watch. 
22 
 
PAB 
1998 10th 
(6th) 
34 2 Pastor Kenny McClinton who 
helped organise the service in 
Portadown town centre on Sunday 
morning. 
23 
 
 
PM 
1998 17th 
(13th) 
1 1 [Picture of mother and son (at the 
Orange Parade?) smiling.] 
24 
 
PM 
1998 17th 
(13th) 
 1 2 [Drumcree church and Orangemen 
behind barbed wire] 
25 
 
PAB 
1998 17th 
(13th) 
2 1 First Minister David Trimble 26 
 
PP 
1998 17th 
(13th) 
2 2 It’s the same in many parts of the 
world and Drumcree is no different 
– soldiers on duty invariably make 
friends with the children caught in a 
conflict not of her own making. Two 
young boys sitting on the wall chat 
with soldiers of the Argyll and 
27 
 
PM 
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Sutherland Highlanders stationed in 
Portadown. 
1998 17th 
(13th) 
4 1 Ken Maginnis [portrait of the Ulster 
Unionist security spokesman] 
28 
 
PP 
1998 17th 
(13th) 
4 2 [Protesters at Drumcree, RUC 
officers and the dividing barbed 
wire between them.] 
29 
 
PAB 
1998 17th 
(13th) 
5 1 Firemen douse the shell of a car 
hijacked and burned near the 
Stonebridge roundabout on the 
main Portadown-Armagh road. ** 
30 
 
VV 
1998 17th 
(13th) 
5 2 Security forces at the ready at 
Drumcree. [silhouette of one RUC 
officer] 
31 
 
PAB 
1998 17th 
(13th) 
5 3 This wasn’t what Orangemen 
wanted in support of their protest at 
Drumcree – a bus burned out after 
being hijacked near the Loyalist 
Parkmore estate. 
32 
 
VV 
1998 17th 
(13th) 
6 1 Former GAA president Peter Quinn 
was one of the mediators in the 
talks between the Orange Order 
and Garvaghy Road residents. 
33 
 
PM 
1998 17th 
(13th) 
6 2 Two streakers make their way to 
the police lines at the field at 
Drumcree last weekend, much to 
the amusement of a crowd of 
spectators. 
34 
 
PAB 
1998 17th 
(13th) 
7 1 The Reverend William Bingham. 
[portrait] 
35 
 
PP 
1998 17th 
(13th) 
7 2 David Jones, spokesperson for the 
Portadown Orangemen, takes 
another call on his mobile at 
Drumcree. [portrait] 
36 
 
PP 
1998 17th 
(13th) 
7 3 One man and his dog – ready for 
battle [RUC officer with a police 
dog] 
37 
 
PAB 
1998 17th 
(13th) 
8 1 Portadown District Master Mr. 
Harold Gracey chats to Pastor 
McClinton in the town centre. 
McClinton conducted the service in 
the town centre organized by 
Portadown women before the 
parade left for Drumcree. 
38 
 
PM 
1998 17th 
(13th) 
8 2 A defiant Loyalist displays the 
Ulster Flag at the security fence at 
Drumcree on Sunday morning. 
39 
 
SSM 
1998 17th 
(13th) 
9 1 Two men attempt to erect a flag on 
the barricade at Drumcree hill. 
40 
 
SSM 
1998 17th 9 2 Secretary of State, Mo Mowlam 41 PP 
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(13th) [portrait]  
1998 17th 
(13th) 
9 3 Keeping watch… A group of 
Orangemen discussed the 
morning’s happenings at Drumcree 
on Sunday morning while a young 
boy surveys the security lines 
through a pair of binoculars. 
42 
 
PAB 
1998 17th 
(13th) 
10 1 Discussing the lie of the land at 
Drumcree. [three Orangemen talk 
beside British and Ulster flags on a 
makeshift pole with Drumcree 
church in the background] 
43 
 
MP 
1998 17th 
(13th) 
10 2 Workers Party President Tom 
French. [portrait] 
44 
 
PP 
1998 17th 
(13th) 
10 3 DUP Assemblyman Mervyn 
Carrick. [portrait] 
45 
 
PP 
1998 17th 
(13th) 
10 4 Assembly member Brid Rodgers. 
[portrait] 
46 
 
PP 
1998 17th 
(13th) 
11 1 Parades Commissioner Alastair 
Graham – the commission lack 
credibility according to UUP deputy 
leader John Taylor. [portrait in front 
of microphones at press 
conference] 
47 
 
PP 
1998 17th 
(13th) 
11 2 Prime Minister Tony Blair. [portrait] 48 
 
PP 
1998 17th 
(13th) 
11 3 There was no doubting this young 
boy’s allegiance as he surveyed the 
police lines near Drumcree Parish 
Church on Sunday.  [boy looking at 
the camera holding on the corner of 
a British flag] ** 
49 
 
SSM 
       
1998 17th 
(13th) 
12-
13 
1 Troops and protestors face each 
other across the barricades. 
SC 1 
 
DC 
1998 17th 
(13th) 
12-
13 
2 These two little girls get a lesson in 
photography. 
SC 2 
 
PM 
1998 17th 
(13th) 
12-
13 
3 A burned-out van on West Street, 
Portadown. 
SC 3 
 
VV 
1998 17th 
(13th) 
12-
13 
4 Garvaghy Road residents distribute 
food sent to them from other parts 
of the province. 
SC 4 
 
 
PM 
1998 17th 
(13th) 
12-
13 
5 Saying it with a mural on the 
Garvaghy Road. 
SC 5 
 
SSM 
1998 17th 
(13th) 
12-
13 
6 On the road again: Orangemen 
involved in the standoff at 
Drumcree held their own parade, 
marching from Dungannon Road to 
the church and then into the field.  
SC 6 
 
MA 
1998 17th 12- 7 Surveying the scene on the Twelfth. SC 7 PAB 
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(13th) 13  
1998 17th 
(13th) 
12-
13 
8 Women of Portadown on the 
march, accompanied by DUP 
Assembly man and Craigavon 
Mayor, Alderman Mervyn Carrick. 
SC 8 
 
MA 
1998 17th 
(13th) 
12-
13 
9 [A mass of protestors at Drumcree] SC 9 
 
MP 
1998 17th 
(13th) 
12-
13 
10 A moat point… Orangemen take a 
close look at the ‘moat’ created by 
the Army as part of the security 
measures around the fields at 
Drumcree to prevent them walking 
their traditional route back into town 
along Garvaghy Road. 
SC 10 
 
PAB 
1998 17th 
(13th) 
12-
13 
11 At The Open Fire. SC 11 
 
VV 
1998 17th 
(13th) 
12-
13 
12 Mrs. Delma Black shows her 
support for the Orangemen at 
Drumcree during a march through 
Portadown by a group of women 
and children. 
SC 12 
 
MA 
       
1998 17th 
(13th) 
18 1 Children in road blockade: Children 
sit on the roadway in support of the 
Orangemen at Drumcree during a 
peaceful protest at Charles Street. 
50 
 
MP 
1998 17th 
(13th) 
18 2 Portadown District Master Harold 
Gracey spells out the message – 
‘We are staying here for as long as 
it takes.’ [portrait of speaking in a 
microphone] 
51 
 
PP 
1998 17th 
(13th) 
19 1 The two sides eye each other 
across the barricades. 
52 
 
DC 
1998 17th 
(13th) 
19 2 Barriers that divide the town: 
Soldiers man the security barrier at 
the junction of Garvaghy Road and 
Park Road. 
53 
 
PAB 
    Total 65 
 
53 + 12 
Special 
Coverage 
(SC) 
photos 
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3c. Portadown Times – July 2000 
 
 
Year 
 
Date (July) 
 
Page 
# 
 
Photo 
# 
 
Image Content 
 
 
# 
 
Type 
 
2000 14th 
(10/12/13th) 
1 1 Police and protesters face one 
another on Monday night when 
Portadown erupted into violence. 
 
1 
 
PAB 
2000 14th 
(10/12/13th) 
1 2 First Minister David Trimble. [portrait] 
 
2 
 
PP 
2000 14th 
(10/12/13th) 
2 1 Portadown town centre was 
deserted on Monday afternoon – a 
combination of the Orange protest 
and a bomb alert. 
 
3 
 
VV 
2000 14th 
(10/12/13th) 
2 2 A car was hijacked and dumped onto 
the railway lines at West St. during 
the height of Monday night’s rioting. 
 
4 
 
VV 
2000 14th 
(10/12/13th) 
3 1 The unacceptable face of protest, 
say the police. A man appears at the 
barbed-wire defenses at Drumcree 
and appears to throw a missile at the 
security forces. It was just one 
incident in the sporadic rioting in the 
week between the two parades that 
were banned from entering the 
Garvaghy Road. 
 
5 
 
VV 
2000 14th 
(10/12/13th) 
  A message in a battle! LOL 903 
trumpeted its message to the world 
with a message on a placard turned 
towards the cameras of the media. ** 
 
6 
 
SSM 
2000 14th 
(10/12/13th) 
4 1 A soldier at work at Drumcree, 
preparing the security fortifications in 
readiness for the arrival of 
Portadown District LOL No. 1 and 
their supporters on Sunday. A ring of 
steel surrounds the Garvaghy 
Road’s estates, with a huge 
engineers-built barrier blocking the 
road leading to them and razor wire 
fencing turning the landscape into a 
near-battle zone. 
         
7 
 
PAB 
2000 14th 
(10/12/13th) 
4 2 Brid Rodgers MLA [portrait] 
 
8 
 
PP 
2000 14th 
(10/12/13th) 
4 3 Two men with key roles to play in the 
Drumcree crisis – RUC Chief 
Constable, Sir Ronnie Flanagan 
(left), and Secretary of State, Peter 
9 
 
PP 
 139 
Mandelson. The Chief Constable 
has called on the Orange order to 
distance itself from the violence: the 
Secretary of State has vowed not to 
yield to bully boy tactics. [two men in 
profile portrait seeming to be 
discussing something] 
 
2000 14th 
(10/12/13th) 
5 1 The scene at Drumcree at lunch time 
on Sunday, when Portadown District 
LOL No. 1 paraded as far as the 
massive security barrier and then 
listened to District Master, Harold 
Gracey, who called for on-going 
protests in support of their bid to 
complete the homeward walk using 
their traditional route. 
 
10 
 
PAB 
2000 14th 
(10/12/13th) 
5 2 Harold Gracey [portrait] 
 
11 
 
PP 
2000 14th 
(10/12/13th) 
5 3 Johnny Adair from Belfast’s 
Shankhill Road. The former UFF 
leader released under license as 
part of the Good Friday Agreement 
having been sentenced to 16 years 
for directing violence, has been at 
Drumcree a lot in recent days, 
fuelling speculation of a joining 
forces on the part of the LVF and 
UFF – which he denies – and 
leading to criticism of the Orange 
Order from many quarters, for 
associating with a convicted terrorist. 
[portrait] 
 
12 
 
PP 
2000 14th 
(10/12/13th) 
6 1 An essential item for Sunday’s 
parade was the umbrella, with heavy 
intermittent showers the order of the 
day. 
13 
 
SSM 
2000 14th 
(10/12/13th) 
6 2 Portadown District Secretary Nigel 
Dawson was among the leaders of 
Sunday’s parade to Drumcree. 
14 
 
PP 
2000 14th 
(10/12/13th) 
6 3 Some smiling, some pensive as the 
‘Drumcree Sunday’ parade makes its 
way to the Church of the Ascension. 
15 
 
MA 
2000 14th 
(10/12/13th) 
6 4 Some of the contingent of 
Orangewomen making their way 
through the town centre to 
Drumcree. 
16 
 
MA 
2000 14th 
(10/12/13th) 
7 1 Under cover – a sea of umbrellas 
was vital against the heavy showers 
at Drumcree on Sunday. 
17 
 
SSM 
2000 14th 
(10/12/13th) 
8 1 ‘Real Victims’ make point at 
Drumcree: Members of the ‘Real 
18 
 
PM 
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Victims’ Support Group’ laid a 
wreath at the security barrier at 
Drumcree on Sunday morning, the 
second successive year they have 
done so. In 1999, the wreath-laying 
ceremony marked the end of the 
Long March from Londonderry to 
Drumcree. ** [The words on the 
banner with members of the group 
say ‘No Terrorists in Government.’] 
2000 14th 
(10/12/13th) 
8 2 This painted sign in the Edgarstown 
area reveals how the protestors view 
the current situation. **  [the sign 
reads ‘Better to Die on Your Feet 
than Live on Your (scratched out – 
perhaps ‘Ass’) No Surrender.’ 
19 
 
SSM 
2000 14th 
(10/12/13th) 
8 3 In the Picture: Alan Milligan, a 
prominent Portadown Orangeman 
and a member of Drumcree’s select 
vestry, raises his eyes to the 
heavens at Drumcree on Sunday 
when, for the third year in a row, 
members of Portadown District LOL 
No. 1 were banned by the Parades 
Commission from returning to their 
dispersal point via the traditional 
Garvaghy Road route. 
20 
 
PP 
2000 14th 
(10/12/13th) 
9 1 It’s an international event on the hill 
now: The annual service at 
Drumcree nowadays attracts 
‘observers’ from all over the world – 
usually at the behest of the 
Garvaghy Road Residents’ Coalition, 
much to the angst of the 
Orangemen. But, as this picture 
shows, they can rely on others for 
support, too.  
21 
 
MP 
2000 14th 
(10/12/13th) 
9 2 The scene in Portadown on 
Wednesday evening, with protestors 
taking to the streets in response to 
the call for demonstrations in support 
of the Drumcree stance. Later, as 
was the case in so many parts of the 
province, it degenerated into the sort 
of violence condemned by 
Archbishop Robin Eames (inset 
[small portrait superimposed on the 
larger image] ). ** 
22 
 
MP 
2000 14th 
(10/12/13th) 
9 3 A soldier keeps a close eye on the 
marchers as the Orange parade 
makes its way to Drumcree Parish 
Church for Sunday morning’s 
service. ** 
23 
 
PAB 
    Total 23  
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Republic of Ireland 
 
4a. The Irish Times – July 1996 
 
 
 
Year 
 
Date 
(July) 
 
Page 
# 
 
Photo 
# 
 
Image Content 
 
 
# 
 
Type 
 
1996 8th 1 1 The Ulster Unionist Party leader, Mr. 
David Trimble, squeezing through the 
RUC lines after negotiations with senior 
officers in an attempt to end the stand-off 
at Drumcree Parish Church 
[Mr. Trimble in the middle of a line of 
RUC officers] 
1 PP 
1996 8th  9 1 The beginning of the stand-off: RUC 
officers blocking Orangemen from 
walking down Garvaghy Road, 
Portadown, from Drumcree Parish 
Church where they held a short service. 
 
2 DC 
1996 8th 9 2 The Rev Ian Paisley passing through 
RUC lines to talk with senior RUC 
officers. ** 
 
3 MP 
1996 8th 9 3 [Map of the Portadown / Drumcree 
march]  
 
4 SSM 
1996 8th 9 4 [Map of the Protests at Orange Services 
in support of the Drumcree stand-off] 
 
5 SSM 
1996 12th 1 1 Nationalist protesters are removed from 
Garvaghy Road by RUC officers 
yesterday to make way for the Orange 
Order march ** 
[Protesters bring dragged by the face by 
RUC officers] 
6 VV 
1996 12th 6 1 A police officer fires a plastic bullet as 
the RUC comes under attack on the 
Garvaghy Road, Portadown, during 
yesterday’s Orange parade. ** 
[police officer pointing a gun] 
7 VV 
1996 12th 6 2 A youth throws a bottle at RUC officers 
shielding Orange marchers as they made 
their way down the Garvaghy Road 
yesterday. ** 
[youth throwing a bottle] 
(comparison between the two photos in 
the layout) ** 
8 VV 
1996 12th 8 1 Orangemen march down Garvaghy Road 
in Portadown yesterday following the 
RUC decision to allow the parade to 
pass through the Nationalist area. The 
9 MA 
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marchers were flanked by hundreds of 
RUC men. 
 
1996 12th 9 1 A Garvaghy Road resident remonstrates 
with Orange marchers ** 
[line of Orange marchers with one 
woman arguing with them with her 
hands] 
10 DC 
1996 12th 9 2 Protesters outside the British Embassy in 
Dublin yesterday ** 
[protesters in support of the Drumcree 
marchers with signs] 
11 MP 
1996 12th 9 3 Sir Hugh Annesley: defended his 
decision 
[portrait of the RUC Chief Constable who 
made the decision to allow the 
Orangemen to march down the 
Garvaghy Road] 
12 PP 
1996 12th 14 1 Mr. David Trimble pictured at Drumcree 
with Orange supporters. He affirmed 
yesterday that no compromise had been 
agreed. 
13 PP 
1996 13th 10 1 An Orange standard-bearer is greeted 
with a kiss on arrival in Portadown after 
marching through Garvaghy Road on 
Thursday. The town has a historic 
significance for Orangemen. ** 
14 SSM 
1996 13th 10 2 Lloyd George: was told the Home Rule 
Bill might pass in the Houses of 
Parliament, “but it will not pass the bridge 
at Portadown”. 
[old portrait of Lloyd George 
accompanying an article understanding 
the importance of the parades for 
Orangemen] 
15 PP 
1996 13th 10 3 Mr. David Trimble: advance knowledge 
of RUC about-face? 
[portrait of Trimble accompanying an 
article about parade decision] 
16 PP 
1996 13th 12 1 COMIC: Orangemen chatting near the 
rubble with the following bubble 
caption… ‘Now that’s over we can get 
back to the peace, reconciliation and 
agreed government talks…’ 
17 CI 
 
 
   Total 17  
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4b. The Irish Times – July 1998 
 
 
 
Year 
 
Date 
(July) 
 
Page 
# 
 
Photo 
# 
 
Image Content 
 
 
# 
 
Type 
 
1998 6th  1 1 Orangemen massed behind the wire 
fence erected by security forces face 
a phalanx of RUC officers in riot gear, 
as they take two Loyalists into 
custody in on of the few incidents at 
Drumcree yesterday. 
 
1 VV 
1998 6th 6 1 An RUC officer falls to his knees after 
being struck by a missile thrown by a 
Loyalist during clashes in Belfast last 
night. The police came under attack 
from Loyalist youths protesting at the 
refusal to permit the Drumcree 
Orange parade to pass down the 
Garvaghy Road in Portadown. 
2 VV 
1998 6th 7 1 Orange Order officials are forced to 
stop at a barbed-wire barricade in 
Drumcree yesterday. After their 
service at Drumcree church, the 
Orangemen marched down to RUC 
lines but there was no senior officer 
there to take their letter of protest. ** 
3 DC 
1998 6th 7 2 [Map of the Portadown Orange 
March] 
 
4 SSM 
1998 6th 3 1 An RUC officer surveys the 
blackened walls of the Ballymoney 
house in which three young boys lost 
their lives after a sectarian arson 
attack 
 
5 VV 
1998 6th 4 1 Soldiers put up barbed wire on the 
roadblock at Drumcree church after it 
was broken through on Saturday 
night. 
[Spectators (including an Orangeman 
in uniform looking on] 
6 DC 
1998 6th 5 1 Archbishop Eames: “People have got 
to live together on this island. People 
have got to find ways of living 
together” 
[portrait/headshot of the Archbishop] 
7 PP 
    Total 7  
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4c. The Irish Times – July 2000 
 
 
 
Year 
 
Date 
(July) 
 
Page 
# 
 
Photo 
# 
 
Image Content 
 
 
# 
 
Type 
 
2000 10th 1 1 Members of the Orange Order taking 
shelter under umbrellas at the 
security barrier blocking entry to the 
Garvaghy Road. 
 
1 PAB 
2000 10th 6 1 The RUC using water cannons 
borrowed from Belgian police to repel 
protesters last Tuesday. 
 
2 VV 
2000 10th 6 2 The Archbishop of Armagh, Dr Robin 
Eames: “Peaceful protest is no longer 
visible – there are those with other 
agendas.” 
[portrait/headshot of the Archbishop] 
3 PP 
2000 10th 7 1 A protester is caught by RUC officers 
after making his way through the 
security forces’ defences at Drumcree 
last night. ** 
 
4 VV 
2000 10th 7 2 Mr. Harold Gracey, District master of 
the Portadown Orange Lodge, 
addressing the large crowd at 
Drumcree yesterday. ** 
 
5 PP 
2000 10th 14 1 Men behind the wire: members of 
Portadown’s Orange Order march 
past razor wire as they head towards 
Drumcree Parish Church yesterday. 
 
6 PAB 
2000 10th 14 2 An Orangeman at Drumcree church 
yesterday captures the scene. ** 
(accompanying an article on the 
peace process) 
7 SSM 
2000 12th   No images published for the 12th 
day of July 2000 
 
*  
2000 13th   No images published for the 13th 
day of July 2000 
*  
    Total 7  
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5a. The Irish Independent – July 1996 
 
 
 
Year 
 
Date 
(July) 
 
Page 
# 
 
Photo 
# 
 
Image Content 
 
 
# 
 
Type 
 
1996 8th 4 1 An angry Ian Paisley, in traditional 
Orange Order sash, passing through 
the RUC lines in Portadown 
yesterday, to negotiate with RUC 
officers after the parade was 
prevented from walking through the 
Nationalist area of the own. 
 
1 DC 
1996 8th 4 2 Ulster Unionist leader David Trimble 
MP being [prevented] from leading 
the parade down the Garvaghy Road. 
 
2 DC 
1996 12th 1 1 Sit-down defiance…Steel booted 
RUC men move in to remove 
Nationalist protesters from the 
Garvaghy Road prior to the Orange 
Order march. 
 
3 DC 
1996 12th 11 1 RUC officers with batons drawn 
moving in to remove the Nationalists 
blocking the Garvaghy Road 
yesterday. 
 
4 VV 
1996 12th 11 2 Little mercy was shown as the RUC 
dragged the protesting Nationalist 
residents from the Garvaghy Road. 
 
5 VV 
1996 12th 11 3 Cardinal Daly: talks [portrait] 
 
6 PP 
1996 12th 11 4 Members of the Orange Order 
marching down Garvaghy Road 
accompanied by a massive RUC 
presence. 
 
7 MA 
1996 12th 12 1 Final plea…a woman pleads with 
Orange Order marchers as they 
parade through the Nationalist 
Garvaghy neighbourhood. 
 
8 MA 
1996 12th 13 1 Sir Patrick: plea to SDLP leaders. 
 
9 PP 
1996 12th 13 2 An RUC officer, backed up by a 
baton-wielding colleague, fires a 
plastic bullet at rioting Nationalists in 
10 VV 
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the Garvaghy Estate after the Orange 
parade was allowed to march down 
Garvaghy Road yesterday. 
 
1996 13th 8 1 ‘A victory for liberty’: Paisley [Ian 
Paisley portrait] 
 
11 PP 
1996 13th 9 1 Children at play near the remains of a 
burned-out lorry on the Nationalist 
Bogside of Derry, following a night of 
rioting in the wake of the Drumcree 
stand-down by the RUC, which 
allowed the Orange parade down 
Garvaghy Road.  
 
12 VV 
1996 13th 9 2 Sir Hugh: due to retire [portrait] 13 PP 
1996 13th 9 3 Cardinal Daly…war of words 14 PP 
    Total 14  
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5b. The Irish Independent – July 1998 
 
 
 
Year 
 
Date 
(July) 
 
Page 
# 
 
Photo 
# 
 
Image Content 
 
 
# 
 
Type 
 
1998 6th 1 1 A British soldier checks razor wear in 
fields around Drumcree Parish 
Church. 
 
1 PAB 
1998 6th 11 1 Stern displeasure: Orange Order 
officials stop their procession at a 
barbed wire and fabricated steel 
barricade blocking their way into 
Garvaghy Road at lunchtime 
yesterday. 
 
2 DC 
1998 6th 11 2 Tense RUC officers block the 
marchers at Drumcree Bridge. 
 
3 DC 
1998 6th 11 3 An Orange supporter is snatched 
from the ‘sterile’ area by RUC men 
yesterday. 
 
4 VV 
1998 6th 14 1 [picture of Orangemen looking 
through barbed wire at Drumcree] 
 
5 PAB 
1998 13th 11 1 Crisis update…Brendan 
MacCoinnaith (above), spokesman 
for the Garvaghy residents in 
Portadown, speaking to the media. 
 
6 PP 
1998 13th 11 2 A soldier re-inforces barricades at 
Drumcree yesterday. 
 
7 PAB 
    Total 
 
7  
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5c. The Irish Independent – July 2000 
 
 
 
Year 
 
Date 
(July) 
 
Page 
# 
 
Photo 
# 
 
Image Content 
 
 
# 
 
Type 
 
2000 10th 1 1 One for the album…an Orangeman 
takes a photograph as he stands at 
the barrier separating Orangemen 
and the security forces at Drumcree 
Church in Portadown yesterday. ** 
 
1 PAB 
2000 10th 1 2 Loyalist leader Johnnie Adair (in white 
tee-shirt) arriving at Drumcree Church 
last night. 
 
2 PP 
2000 10th 7 1 Behind the wire…Orangemen walking 
past barbed wire erected by the 
security forces near St. John’s 
Catholic Church in Portadown. 
 
3 PAB 
2000 10th 8 1 Orangemen led by Harold Gracey 
parade to the barrier separating them 
and the security forces at Drumcree 
Church in Portadown yesterday. 
 
4 DC 
2000 12th   No images published for the 12th 
day of July 2000 
*  
2000 13th   No images published for the 13th 
day of July 2000 
 
*  
    Total 
 
4  
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Britain (outside Northern Ireland) 
 
6a. The Times – July 1996 
 
 
 
Year 
 
Date 
(July) 
 
Page 
# 
 
Photo 
# 
 
Image Content 
 
 
# 
 
Type 
 
1996 8th 2 1 Police confront Orangemen on the 
Drumcree Road, barring their way 
through a Catholic area of 
Portadown ** 
[image of back of RUC officers and 
the angered faces of some 
Orangemen being blocked from 
marching] 
1 DC 
1996 12th 1 1 An RUC officer fires in defence of 
the marchers ** 
[RUC officer with gun pointed] 
 
2 VV 
1996 12th 2 1 Garvaghy Road: RUC officer seizing 
one of about 300 Nationalist 
protesters ** 
[RUC officer holding head of scared 
protester] 
3 VV 
1996 13th 10 1 
(group) 
Moderates hope for a gesture from 
Trimble, left, to reassure democratic 
Nationalists such as Mallon 
[Portraits of Trimble and Mallon 
accompanying an article about the 
peace process and the marches] 
4 PP 
 
 
   Total 4  
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6b. The Times – July 1998 
 
 
 
Year 
 
Date 
(July) 
 
Page 
# 
 
Photo 
# 
 
Image Content 
 
 
# 
 
Type 
 
1998 6th 4 1 Orangemen peer through rolls of 
barbed wire close to Drumcree 
church yesterday. A huge military 
operation prevented them from 
marching along the Garvaghy Road 
** 
1 PAB 
1998 6th 4 2 Tense: a soldier peers put of the 
barricades 
 
2 PAB 
1998 6th 4 3 Trimble: Close contact 
[portrait of David Trimble] 
 
3 PP 
1998 13th 2 1 Orangemen looking over the 
defences at Drumcree yesterday. 
Their total number was a fraction of 
the thousands who turned out a week 
earlier **  
(under the title: ‘Balaclava hijacks the 
bowler hat’) 
[four men looking down at the barbed 
wire] 
 
4 PAB 
1998 13th 2 2 A mural in the Garvaghy Road, from 
which marching Orangemen have 
been barred ** 
[picture of the Nationalist billboards 
with a little boy walking past them] 
 
5 SSM 
1998 13th 3 1 The boys who died: (from left) Jason, 
7, Mark, 9, and Richard, 11. Behind 
them is their brother, Lee, who was 
staying with his grandparents 
[family portrait of the four Quinn boys] 
6 VI 
1998 13th 3 2 A policeman outside the blaze house. 
Yesterday some Catholics were 
leaving the estate 
[picture of two houses that have a 
burn mark down the middle] 
 
7 VV 
 
 
   Total 7  
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6c. The Times – July 2000 
 
 
 
Year 
 
Date 
(July) 
 
Page 
# 
 
Photo 
# 
 
Image Content 
 
 
# 
 
Type 
 
2000 10 1 1 COMIC: A cartoon that questions the 
changing tactics of the Orangemen 
with an ‘Orange Fun Run’ sign in the 
front of one Orangeman’s shirt 
 
1 CI 
2000 10 4 1 Orangemen led by Harold Gracey, 
centre, halt their parade at the 
barrier separating the Loyalists and 
the security forces as Drumcree 
Church ** 
[Picture of Harold Gracey looking 
directly at the camera surrounded by 
Orangemen with Drumcree church in 
the background] 
2 PP 
2000 10 4 2 
(group) 
Power players: Flannagan, Lewis, 
Mac Cionnaith 
[three individual portraits of those 
involved in the Drumcree battle] 
 
3 PP 
2000 12th   No images published for the 12th 
day of July 2000 
*  
2000 13th   No images published for the 13th 
day of July 2000 
 
*  
 
 
   Total 3  
 
Total, 272 + 12 special coverage images = 284 total images (all newspapers) 
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